Please note: All events will take place in the Jackman Humanities Building (JHB), 170 St. George Street, on the downtown (St. George) campus of the University of Toronto, unless otherwise specified.

Veuillez noter : tous les événements auront lieu au pavillon Jackman (JHB), 170 rue St. George, sur le campus central de l’Université de Toronto, sauf indication contraire.

**Thursday, October 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</table>
| 2:00 PM–3:30 PM | **Coffee and Registration**  
Jackman Humanities Building  
Outside JHB 100 |
| 3:30 PM–5:00 PM | **Plenary Session**  
JAY LAMPERT  
(UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH)  
“AFTER EFFECTS®: EDITING AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION”  
Chair: Shannon Hoff (Institute for Christian Studies)  
JHB 100 |
| 5:00 PM–7:00 PM | **Reception**  
JHB 100 |

**Friday, October 11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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| 10:00 AM–10:30 AM | **Coffee and Registration**  
Outside JHB 100 |
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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</table>
| 10:30 AM–11:15 AM| **Lorraine Markotic**  
  (University of Calgary)  
  “NIETZSCHE’S DIONYSIAN IN PAN’S LABYRINTH”  
  Chair: Tyler Wigg-Stevenson  
  (Toronto School of Theology)  
  JHB 401 | **Samir Gandesha**  
  (Simon Fraser University)  
  “HEGEL’S HOMECOMING OF SPIRIT”  
  Chair: Casey Ford (Guelph)  
  JHB 100 |
| 11:15 AM–12:00 PM| **Michael Butler**  
  (University of Memphis)  
  “DO NOT ASK WHO I AM AND DO NOT ASK ME TO REMAIN THE SAME: FOUCAULT’S DISCONTINUOUS SUBJECT IN THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE”  
  Chair: Lis Paquette (York)  
  JHB 401 | **Jeffrey Reid**  
  (University of Ottawa)  
  “HEGEL’S COMETS AND MOONS: SYSTEMATIC CRITICISM, IRONY, AND US”  
  Chair: Ryan Krahn (Guelph)  
  JHB 100 |
| 12:00 PM–2:00 PM | Lunch (on your own)  
  &  
  Business Meeting in JHB 401 (all are welcome) |
| 2:00 PM–3:00 PM  | **Espen Hammer**  
  (Temple University)  
  “HUSserL AND THE INNER-OUTER DISTINCTION”  
  Chair: Marie-Eve Morin (Alberta)  
  JHB 100 |
| 3:00 PM–3:45 PM  | **Jay Worthy**  
  (University of Alberta)  
  “ON THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF REFLECTION”  
  Chair: Sean Smith (Toronto)  
  JHB 401 | **Peter Gratton**  
  (Memorial University of Newfoundland)  
  “DECONSTRUCTIVE REALISM: IT’S ABOUT TIME”  
  Chair: John Caruana (Ryerson)  
  JHB 100 |
| 3:45 PM–4:00 PM  | Coffee Break  
  Outside JHB 100 |
| 4:00 PM–4:45 PM  | **Mathias Warnes**  
  (University of British Columbia)  
  “SAINT PAUL AND HÖLDERLIN AT HEIDEGGER’S FESTIVAL: FROM HERMENEUTICAL ESCHATOLOGY TO PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE FOURFOLD”  
  Chair: Karen Robertson (Guelph)  
  JHB 401 | **Ferit Güven**  
  (Earlham College)  
  “DERRIDA, DECONSTRUCTION, DECOLONIZATION AND DEMOCRACY”  
  Chair: Brigitte Sassen (McMaster)  
  JHB 100 |
Panel

Spirit Loves to Hide: Hegel and the Conditions of Action

DAVID CIAVATTA
(RYERSON UNIVERSITY)
“HEGEL ON THE ORGANIC CONDITIONS OF AGENCY”

SHANNON HOFF
(INSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIAN STUDIES)
“HEGEL ON LAW AND AGENCY”

JOHN RUSSON
(UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH)
“HAUNTED BY HISTORY: SPIRIT IN MERLEAU-PONTY AND HEGEL”

Chair: Charlie Cooper Simpson (Toronto)
JHB 100

Saturday, October 12

8:30 AM–9:00 AM
Coffee and Registration
Outside JHB 100

9:00 AM–9:45 AM
MIKE BENNETT
(MCMASTER UNIVERSITY)
“What Do Deleuze and Guattari Mean by ‘Infinite Speed’?”
Chair: Niomi Anna Cherney (Ryerson/York)
JHB 418

ALEXANDER SHOUMAROV
(UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)
“First Person Authority and Freedom in Heidegger’s Being and Time”
Chair: Matt Klaassen
(Institute for Christian Studies)
JHB 100

9:45 AM–10:30 AM
SANJA DEJANOVIĆ
(YORK UNIVERSITY)
“The Eternal Return in Deleuze’s Philosophy: Displacing the Verb ‘to Be’”
Chair: Sam Caldwell (Toronto)
JHB 418

LAURA McMATHON
(VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY)
“The Phantom Organic: Merleau-Ponty and the Psychoanalysis of Nature”
Chair: Joshua Harris
(Institute for Christian Studies)
JHB 100

10:30 AM–10:45 AM
Coffee break
Outside JHB 100
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Room</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:45 AM–11:30 AM</td>
<td><strong>Oisín Keohane</strong> <em>(University of Toronto, University of Johannesburg)</em></td>
<td>&quot;The Impossible Force of 'Mightlessness': Translating Derrida's Impouvoir and Heidegger's Machtlose&quot;</td>
<td>Andrew Tebbutt (Toronto)</td>
<td>JHB 418</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30 AM–11:45 AM</td>
<td><strong>David Morris</strong> <em>(Concordia University)</em></td>
<td>&quot;Merleau-Ponty, Movement and Development: On the Difference Between Being and Determinate Being&quot;</td>
<td>Kym Maclaren (Ryerson)</td>
<td>JHB 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30 AM–12:30 PM</td>
<td><strong>Krzysztof Ziarek</strong> <em>(University at Buffalo)</em></td>
<td>&quot;Event, Singularity, Finitude after Heidegger&quot;</td>
<td>Maxime Doyon (Montréal)</td>
<td>JHB 100</td>
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<td>12:30 PM–1:30 PM</td>
<td><strong>Carolyn Shapiro</strong> <em>(University of Toronto)</em></td>
<td>&quot;The Light of the Public Obscures Everything’: Heidegger on Authentic Being-With&quot;</td>
<td>Bryan Richard (ICS/Guelph)</td>
<td>JHB 418</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:30 PM–2:00 PM</td>
<td><strong>George Tomlinson</strong> <em>(Kingston University)</em></td>
<td>&quot;Temporalising a Materialist Concept of History&quot;</td>
<td>Benjamin Shank (Institute for Christian Studies)</td>
<td>JHB 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:00 PM–3:00 PM</td>
<td><strong>Plenary Session</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rebecca Comay</strong> <em>(University of Toronto)</em> &quot;Paradoxes of Lament in Benjamin&quot;</td>
<td>Lorraine Markotic (Calgary)</td>
<td>JHB 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:00 PM–4:00 PM</td>
<td><strong>Coffee break</strong></td>
<td>Outside JHB 100</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:00 PM–4:45 PM</td>
<td><strong>Olivier Mathieu</strong> <em>(McGill University)</em></td>
<td>&quot;Can Poetic Saying Account for More (or Less) Than Great Artworks?&quot;</td>
<td>Brian Rogers (Guelph)</td>
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<td>4:00 PM–4:45 PM</td>
<td><strong>Christian Lotz</strong> <em>(Michigan State University)</em></td>
<td>&quot;Autonomy of the Political? Marx through Poulantzas, Badiou, and Negri&quot;</td>
<td>Ron Kuipers (Institute for Christian Studies)</td>
<td>JHB 100</td>
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Plenary Session

LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART
(INSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIAN STUDIES/UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

“HUSSELR’S CONCEPTION OF TRUTH”
Chair: Sean McGrath (Memorial)
JHB 100

Dinner
Sign up at the registration desk by Friday end of day
for a common meal at
Rol San
323 Spadina Avenue
(Chinese cuisine. Each person pays his/her own way. Space is limited.)

Eighth annual Symposium Book Prize: the CSCP executive committee would like to congratulate this year’s recipient of Symposium’s annual book prize: Sean D. Kirkland, for The Ontology of Socratic Questioning in Plato’s Early Dialogues, SUNY Press, 2012.

The CSCP executive committee would also like to congratulate the winner of this year’s graduate student essay prize: George Tomlinson (Kingston) for his paper entitled “Temporalising a Materialist Concept of History.”

Félicitations aux deux gagnants!

The CSCP would like to thank the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible:

Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur appui:

Our hosts: the Centre for Philosophy, Religion and Social Ethics, Institute for Christian Studies; and the Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto.

Our sponsors: the Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University; the Centre for Comparative Literature, University of Toronto; Victoria College and the Program in Literary Studies, University of Toronto; and the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures, University of Toronto.

Our organizing committee: Allyson Carr (Associate Director, Centre for Philosophy, Religion and Social Ethics, Institute for Christian Studies); Rebecca Comay (Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto); Shannon Hoff (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Institute for Christian Studies); and Lambert Zuidervaart (Chair of the Organizing Committee, Professor of Philosophy, Institute for Christian Studies/University of Toronto).
Abstracts / Résumés

Mike Bennett (McMaster University), “What Do Deleuze and Guattari Mean by ‘Infinite Speed’?”
The notion of “infinite speed” plays a key role in *What is Philosophy?*, as the feature of chaos that philosophy emulates in its creation of concepts. This paper shows how the operative conception of infinite speed is derived from Deleuze’s readings of Epicurean atomism in *Difference and Repetition*, where he argues that the Epicurean swerve (*clinamen*) occurs at a speed faster than the minimum thinkable time, and in ‘Lucretius and the Simulacrum,’ which credits Epicurus with a novel conception of infinity. This paper explains the derivation, paying close attention to Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ texts, as well as the associated secondary literature, an approach which enables me to supplement and correct some of Deleuze’s specific uses of Epicurus, while ultimately defending Deleuze’s neo-Epicurean image of thought.

Michael Butler (University of Memphis), “‘Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same’: Foucault’s discontinuous subject in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*”
This paper attempts to fill a gap in Foucault scholarship around the question of subjectivity in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. It will begin by laying out a common criticism of Foucault’s account (or rather alleged lack of account) of subjectivity. On this Anti-Subjective Reading, Foucault’s rejection of the continuous subject as the engine of historical progress leaves his account of subjectivity overly deterministic, lacking a means of resistance to oppression, and morally suspect. In contrast to this, I will argue that by bringing to light a change that has arisen in the practice of history and questioning the unities taken for granted in the history of ideas, Foucault reveals that human beings need not be bound to a self-conception that is self-continuous. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault shows us that instead of occupying a single, continuous subjectivity that lends meaning to all facets of an individual life, human beings are capable of occupying various subject-positions that allow for greater intellectual flexibility and a greater ability to address systems of oppression from various angles.

David Ciavatta (Ryerson University), “Hegel on the Organic Conditions of Agency”
In this paper, certain features of the peculiar ontology of action are developed along Hegelian lines. The particular focus is on the question of whether and how actions can be located in space and time. It is argued that light can be shed on this question by exploring Hegel’s account of how the nature of living organisms challenges some of our more familiar conceptions of spatio-temporal being. For instance, for Hegel the ontology of organic life involves a suspension of the basic distinction between internal and external, as well as of the notion that a being can be fully present at any given point in time, and it is shown that these dimensions of the ontology of life can be fruitfully applied to the account of human action as well.
Rebecca Comay (University of Toronto), “Paradoxes of Lament in Benjamin”
Lament is at first glance a performative speech act like any other: it intensifies the grief it speaks of and thus ineluctably does what it describes. But its performativity is peculiar. Rather than expressing the potency of language — its ability to produce the state of affairs it designates (I baptize you, I order you, etc.) — the lament points to an impotence or undoing that erodes the sinews of both speech and action. While the possibility of malfunction is built into every speech act as the structural condition of its success (my promise counts as one only if it can be broken; my command has authority only if it can be disregarded, etc.), the lament takes failure as its founding premise. Infelicity — muteness — is not just a contingent possibility of lament but its essential condition. The expression of loss is bound to a loss of expression that escalates with every measure to staunch it. Benjamin explores this paradox in the Trauerspiel book. This paper explores some of its implications.

Sanja Dejanovic (York University), “The Eternal Return in Deleuze’s Philosophy: Displacing the Verb ‘to Be’”
In Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze places the accent on three moments in the history of philosophy in which the univocity of being has been advanced. Spinoza holds second place in these three moments, the third being Nietzsche’s eternal return. With the eternal return, Deleuze argues, univocal being is not merely thought as in Duns Scotus’s philosophy, or affirmed by Spinoza, but “effectively realized.” What we intend to do in this short piece is show how the eternal return realizes the univocal nature of being, by focusing in on the role Nietzsche plays in Deleuze’s efforts to displace the verb “to be.” By exploring the syntheses of time from the perspective of the eternal return, we seek to demonstrate how it is that Deleuze formulates a new discourse of being, able to support the conception of sense furthered in The Logic of Sense.

Samir Gandesha (Simon Fraser University), “Hegel’s Homecoming of Spirit”
This paper takes up Jeff Malpas’s idea of “topography” or the notion that place plays a key role in philosophical conceptualization. It does so by paying specific attention to the close relation between the concept of “Experience” (Erfahrung) in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a kind of journey or Fahrt entailing a “Homecoming of Spirit.” Freedom for Hegel, then, is a kind of inhabitation in which, as he shows in his later political philosophy, one grasps the rational content of one’s own tradition comprising ethical life (Sittlichkeit). However, as Hegel himself admits, the Pöbel or the “rabble” can never be fully integrated within the structures of ethical life, a result of which ethical life is haunted by a remainder forever beyond its rational grasp.
Peter Gratton (Memorial University of Newfoundland), “Deconstructive Realism: It’s about Time”
This paper argues that the recent movement called “speculative realism” merely returns us to Platonisms critiqued throughout 20th-century continental philosophy, and perhaps this is why such thinkers as Derrida have come under such withering criticism from exemplars of this movement. This paper stands against this turn in recent Continental philosophy, arguing that at the heart of Derrida’s project is not a linguistic idealism, but an important realism. The upshot of reading Derrida this way is to combat a “metaphysics of presence” that is repeated in speculative realism—however divergent the thinking of Meillassoux and Harman—and, worse, treats time as epiphenomenal, a veritable Platonic anti-realism. This paper will take us from summarizing Derrida’s early arguments about textuality and the metaphysics of presence, then through the arguments of the “speculative realists,” before returning to a critique of the latter in the name of a temporal realism.

Ferit Güven (Earlham College), “Derrida, Deconstruction, Decolonization and Democracy”
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between Derrida’s deconstruction and decolonization. Derrida recognizes the relationship between philosophy and colonization in his essay titled “The Crisis in the Teaching of Philosophy.” By analyzing this short text, I argue that Derrida’s conception of democracy-to-come is the key in understanding the relationship between deconstruction and decolonization of, what I would call, disciplinary-capitalist neocolonial world order. However, Derrida’s idea of democracy-to-come has to be considered in relation to two other concepts namely hospitality and justice. I claim that without the emphasis on these connections between democracy-to-come and justice and hospitality, the idea of democracy-to-come remains as a Eurocentric conviction. Derrida’s notion of deconstruction in general and his idea of l’avenir (to-come) in particular are promising for the prospect of decolonization provided that we can extricate them from some of the Eurocentric presuppositions of “democracy-to-come.”

Espen Hammer (Temple University), “Husserl and the Inner-Outer Distinction”
Husserl is often interpreted as having formulated a philosophy of the subject or consciousness that distinguishes sharply between the inner and the outer, sees thinking and meaning as essentially separated from actual engagement with the world, and understands the fundamental philosophical challenge as that of securing some sort of match between mind and world based on the discovery of indubitable, foundational qualities inherent in mental content. The paper discusses some of the key assumptions on which this interpretation rests. It concludes by suggesting that Husserl ends up rejecting the Cartesian inner-outer distinction, adopting instead a phenomenology of radically situated interactionism.
Shannon Hoff (Institute for Christian Studies), “Hegel on Law and Agency”
In this paper, I show that law, properly understood, is an extension of human identity, a mechanism of organization that precedes and conditions action, and an organization of space and interaction that responds powerfully to the fact that human beings live in a sense “outside of” themselves. In other words, I demonstrate the ways in which law, initiated in the organization of freedom’s externalization in property, is a “non-limiting limitation” internal to human experience, rather than a merely external limitation. Using Hegel’s characterization of law in the Encyclopædia as “an absolute final aim” and “valid custom,” I explore how law is the condition, freely produced end, and substance of agency, and why the “immediate subject” may fail to see law as such. Finally, however, I explore the ways in which law is limited in its operation, and must be supplemented by mechanisms of justice that lie beyond its determining power.

Oisín Keohane (University of Toronto/University of Johannesburg), “The Impossible Force of ‘Mightlessness’: Translating Derrida’s impouvoir and Heidegger’s Machtlose”
Derrida, in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign, examines the notion of Walten in Heidegger, making note of its various forceful connotations. Three texts occupy Derrida in his discussion of Walten, Heidegger’s 1929 seminar (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics), his 1935 seminar (Introduction to Metaphysics) and his 1957 Identity and Difference. I argue that while Derrida has provided us with invaluable insights into Heidegger’s early work, he has missed Heidegger’s turn in the late 1930s towards das Machtlose, the ‘unpower’ which is beyond power and lack of power. An ‘unpower’ that I argue Heidegger associates, from the 1940s to the 1950s, with stillness and the carrying of the world. The importance of ‘unpower’ is highlighted because Derrida associates the neologism impouvoir (‘unpower’) not, as we might expect, with Machtlose, but rather, problematically, with Entmachtung (disempowering) and die Ohnmacht (impotence). Moreover, Derrida will go on to uncannily mimic Heidegger by contrasting the impouvoir of the unconditional with the majestic power of the sovereign.

Jay Lampert (University of Guelph), “After Effects®: Editing and Phenomenology of Perception”
We can derive a new model of perception from digital special effects programs like Adobe After Effects, and digital editing programs like Avid Compositor, and Final Cut. Philosophers of film have discussed the aesthetics of digital cinema, but not the phenomenology of the act of compositing. This paper will consider three topics: the art of perceptual control; compositing perception by layers; and implications for phenomenological structures like time, perspective, reflexivity, wholes and parts, and consistency.
Christian Lotz (Michigan State University), “Autonomy of the Political? Marx through Poulantzas, Badiou, and Negri”  
Prior to the development of his later theory of Capitalism as a totality of social relations and their reproduction, Marx had his “political” moment in 1843. This “crisis of 1843” (Abensour) in Marx’s thought, let us repose the question of whether the political or the economic has priority in Marx’s thought, especially given that recent European philosophy has moved away from Marx, which is especially visible in Rancière and Badiou. In this paper, I reconstruct Marx’s early radical political concept by discussing it in relation to recent work in political philosophy and Marxist thought, specifically the work of Poulantzas, Abensour, Badiou, and Negri.

Lorraine Markotic (University of Calgary), “Nietzsche’s Dionysian in Pan’s Labyrinth”  
In The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, Nietzsche expounds his concept of the Dionysian – over against that of the Apollonian. The art of film, with its visual dimension and traditionally narrative form, would seem to be Apollonian. Pan’s Labyrinth, however, can be interpreted as being Dionysian and indeed to be about the Dionysian. The film presents the story of a young girl in 1944 fascist Spain. Instead of attempting to deny or repress the terror and horror and the absurdity of her surroundings, the protagonist represents them. She transfigures the Dionysian into Apollonian form. Moreover, the film itself epitomizes Nietzsche’s Dionysian insofar as it presents events that cannot be fathomed, and insofar as it remains unclear as to how these events should be approached. In this way, Pan’s Labyrinth fosters the non-conceptual and exemplifies the spirit of music. It advocates Nietzsche’s Dionysian over against Socrates’ optimistic rationality.

Olivier Mathieu (McGill University), “Can Poetic Saying Account for More (or Less) Than Great Artworks?”
I mean to show that we can use the intentional structure of poetic saying, ‘Dichtung’, to describe the accomplishment of an artwork in the institutional setting of an artworld. To that end, I describe the artist’s accomplishment as an ‘act of specification’ and explain how it can be thought to be a necessary condition to the determination of a phenomenon as an artwork. I then argue that the intentional structure of poetic saying is coherent with a description of the act of specification. In order to do so, I show that poetic saying is not essentially tied to the advent of ‘great artworks’ even if Heidegger explicitly claims to discuss nothing but such works in The Origin of the Work of Art. I then make explicit the intentional structure that conditions poetic saying as a meaning-event (Sinnereignis). Finally, I argue that it appropriately describes the intentionality necessary to the success of an act of specification.
Laura McMahon (Villanova University), “The Phantom Organic: Merleau-Ponty and the Psychoanalysis of Nature”

This paper discusses Merleau-Ponty’s call in a working note of The Visible and the Invisible to “do a psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the mother” through an engagement with his revitalization of Freudian psychoanalysis and aspects of his philosophy of nature. Through a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the work of embodiment, habit, and repression in cases of phantom limb, I argue that modern human existence represses its own organic nature, which demands to be (psycho)analytically uncovered as the “unconscious” source of every aspect of our personal lives. Our personal identities articulate themselves in time through a chiasmic styling of the natural origins which haunt present experience, and which can only be discovered in present experience. Nature is discovered as the “heartbeat” of conscious life, while personal style is in turn grasped as the heartbeat of even our most automatic natural reflexes.

David Morris (Concordia University), “Merleau-Ponty, Movement and Development: On the Difference between Being and Determinate Being”

I first trace a pervasive error in philosophy and science, namely, reducing being to already determinate being, an error targeted in Merleau-Ponty’s familiar critique of the ready-made world. I argue that Merleau-Ponty turns to movement and organismic development to find a way to avoid repeating this error, by revealing movements of nature as cases in which being shows that it engenders determinacy—yet not by already containing the determinacy ‘to follow.’ I demonstrate this by analyzing Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Coghill and Gesell on organismic development in the Lectures on Nature, also drawing on issues of perceived movement in these lectures and the recently published Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression, with some help from an unpublished note on dynamic morphology. The argument is that these phenomena both shed light on and entail an ontology in which movement as radically generative development is elemental.

Jeffrey Reid (University of Ottawa), “Hegel’s Comets and Moons: Systematic Criticism, Irony, and Us”

This paper examines the ambiguous relation, in Hegel, between criticism’s role within the system, and forms of Romantic irony. Systematic criticism involves a particular expression of negativity that is associated with the dialectical moment of the for-another. I refer to this negativity as “cometary”, and discover its dissolving, fluidifying action in texts on the solar system, from the Philosophy of Nature, where it is opposed to a rival “lunar” moment of particularity. These natural figures help us recognize how systematic criticism addresses ironic (lunar) forms in more spiritual settings: in Hegel’s philosophies of history and art. Finally, the
paper briefly ponders the question of how the systematic criticism of the for-another may be meant to involve us, critical readers of Hegel.

**John Russon (University of Guelph), “Haunted by History: Spirit in Merleau-Ponty and Hegel”**

I use Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the phenomenon of the phantom limb from *The Phenomenology of Perception* to identify a hidden dimension implicit in all action. I use this notion to interpret Hegel’s notion of “spirit” from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as, essentially, the phantom presence of history in our experience. I conclude with a brief consideration of the relationship between spirit and our literary and artistic traditions.

**Carolyn Shapiro (University of Toronto), “‘The Light of the Public Obscures Everything’: Heidegger on Authentic Being-With”**

This paper argues that Heidegger’s attempts to reconcile ‘ authenticity’ (*Eigentlichkeit*) with ‘being-with’ (*Mitsein*) in Being and Time are unsatisfactory. It begins by examining the tension between public interpretation and *Dasein*’s ownmost possibilities for being through an analysis of being-toward-death and the call of conscience. It continues by treating three objections oriented around the view that *Dasein* is being-with authentically when it is being-in-the-world authentically. It argues that this view can neither answer for the fact that authenticity amounts to disentangling oneself from others, nor reconcile being-with as a structural feature of being-in-the-world with ‘mineness’ and ‘non-relationality’, which are characteristic of *Dasein*’s authentic being-toward-death. Moreover, Heidegger’s view of authenticity poses obstacles for conceiving of authentic learning or accountability to others in the public sphere. The paper concludes that authentic being-with is, on Heidegger’s account, reduced to an a priori self-relation.

**Alexander Shoumarov (University of Toronto), “First Person Authority and Freedom in Heidegger’s Being and Time”**

The traditional conception of first-person normative authority holds self-consciousness and responsiveness to absolute principle to be two conditions required for spontaneous human agency. As thrown being that finds itself thoroughly conditioned by its situation, *Dasein* fails to satisfy these conditions. It can never gain absolute power over its thrown ground, while its possibilities are initially fully determined by the undifferentiated public “One” of the they-self. Nevertheless, the call of conscience announces to *Dasein* its “ownmost,” individualizing possibility of being-toward-death. In virtue of this possibility, *Dasein* is able to enown its thrown ground and “make up for not choosing”. In this paper I trace the connection between first-person authority and the phenomenon of existential death, with reference to the finitude of authentic temporality.
George Tomlinson (Kingston University), “Temporalising a Materialist Concept of History”
This paper is guided by the conviction that a philosophy of history must be thought in conjunction with a philosophy of time. Such a position constitutes a problem for Marx’s and Engel’s materialist concept of history in *The German Ideology*, because no analysis of the relationship between time, temporality and this concept is offered. In order to begin to temporalise this concept of history, it is necessary to first consider the relationship between materiality and temporality in Marx more generally. This paper maintains that materiality must be read as temporality in Marx in order to read the ‘first historical act’ in *The German Ideology* as a temporal act. After revisiting the philosophical dimensions of Marx’s concept of need, which more than any other concept structures this act, this paper disinters a temporality within Marx’s and Engels’s materialist concept of history which is fundamentally opposed to a historicist model of linear, progressive time.

Mathias Warnes, “Saint Paul and Hölderlin at Heidegger’s Festival: From Hermeneutical Eschatology to Phenomenology of the Fourfold”
This paper examines the role played by the festival (Greek ἑορτή) coupling of Ursprung and Erspringen in Heidegger’s early hermeneutic and later being-historical account of history and moment (καιρός). I explore the connection of the WS 1920/1 course on St. Paul on παρουσία with the 1936/7 *Contributions to Philosophy* on the eschatological theme of the “other beginning” as “intimate celebration of the last god,” and in relation to Heidegger’s overall interpretation of Hölderlin’s festival as a round dance of limit-founding demigods.

Jay Worthy (University of Alberta), “On the Phenomenology of Reflection”
However necessary it may be, the focus of phenomenology on consciousness, perception, and sensation risks that it perpetually assume a kind of presence – of nature, of the world, and of the self – in order to begin its inquiry. An important question, then, is whether to reflect on what is given will only reinforce the assumption of presence, or whether it will liberate us from the latter, allowing the incorporation of non-presence into phenomenological inquiry. In this paper, I take up three different models of double-sensation as a “kind of reflection,” tracking developments from Husserl in *Ideas II* to Merleau-Ponty in *The Visible and the Invisible*. Against Derrida, I argue that, although the “touched touching” of the handshake appears to be the most deferent to presence, the notion of the flesh that subtends it is in fact the most vigilant in its attempt to incorporate non-presence into a phenomenology of reflection.

Krzysztof Ziarek (University at Buffalo), “Event, Singularity, Finitude after Heidegger”
“Event” has emerged as the focal notion in Continental thought from mid-20th century to the present, from its first incarnation in Heidegger’s *Ereignis* to Badiou’s work, where it is presented as an alternative to Heidegger and post-structuralist approaches. Against the backdrop of the
French elaborations of the notion of the event, I re-examine Heidegger’s *Ereignis* in the context of the recently published “private” writings (volumes 65, 66, 69, 70, and 71 of the *Gesamtausgabe*). I show how Heidegger’s unprecedented approach to the event is linked to his idiomatic understanding of mortality, especially its significance for two critically important notions: first, *Einzigkeit* (uniqueness or singleness) and second, *Anfänglichkeit*, inceptuality or inceptiveness. Neither of these notions has been given sufficient attention and together they not only serve as important and interesting rejoinders to various critical points made by Derrida or Badiou, and, more important, offer the possibility of developing an unprecedented perspective on the notion of the new.

*Lambert Zuidervaart (Institute for Christian Studies), “Husserl’s Conception of Truth”*

This paper explores two questions Ernst Tugendhat posed in *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (1967). Can Edmund Husserl’s conception of truth help philosophers connect the concept of propositional truth with a more comprehensive and life-oriented idea of truth without short-circuiting either side? If so, to what extent? I focus on the conception of truth that Husserl proposes in his path breaking *Logische Untersuchungen* (*Logical Investigations*), originally published in 1900 – 1901. First I review the readings of Husserl given by three influential post-Heideggerian philosophers: Emmanuel Levinas, Theodor Adorno, and Jacques Derrida. Next I examine selected passages in Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen*. Then I attempt a critical retrieval of Husserl’s conception of truth, one that not only evaluates his contribution in light of influential assessments by Levinas, Adorno, and Derrida but also interrogates the objections and worries they raise. My aim is to provide a redemptive critique of Husserl’s conception of truth, a critique simultaneously indebted to his conception and critical of it.