Annual Meeting, May 28-30, 2005
University of Western Ontario
All sessions, including special events, will be held in Somerville House, Room 2355

Special Events

Book Session: The Author’s Intention (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004)
by Jeff Mitscherling, Tanya DiTommaso, and Aref Nayed
Speakers: Jeff Mitscherling, Gary Madison, Graeme Nicholson
   Saturday, May 28, 2 – 5 pm

Panel: Violence, Victimization and a Phenomenology of Evil
Speakers: Wendy Hamblet, Diane Enns
   Sunday, May 29, 3 – 5 pm

Special Evening Session: David Allison, “An Aesthetic Taste for Moral
   Metacritique”
   Sunday, May 29, 7:30 – 9 pm

Joint Session with the International Institute for Hermeneutics:
   “Derrida’s Hermeneutic Interludes”
Speakers: Andrzej Wiercinski, Sean McGrath, Boyd Blundell, Gary Madison
   Monday, May 30, 10 – 12 noon

Receptions

CSCP Reception, Saturday, May 28, 5 – 7 pm, SH 3320

President’s Reception, Sunday, May 29 (Rm TBA)
**CSCP/SCPC Program 2005**

**Saturday, May 28**

8:50 am  Welcome

9-10 am  “Gadamer’s Approach to the Beginning of Philosophy”
John Beach, Université de Montréal
Chair: Shannon Dea, University of Western Ontario

10-11 am  “The Restricted Horizon: Gadamer’s Fear of Science”
Shannon Dea, University of Western Ontario
Chair: Jennifer Eustis, Dominican College of Philosophy & Theology

11-12 noon  “Heidegger’s Etymological Method: Not Fencing Off, but Expanding the Field of the Word”
Matthew King, York University
Chair: Chris Anderson-Irwin, York University

12-1 pm  LUNCH

1-2 pm  “Revising the Concept of Recognition: Reflections on the Work of Kelly Oliver, Paul Ricoeur, Luce Irigaray and the Canadian Supreme Court of Canada”
Morny Joy, University of Calgary
Chair: Eleanor Godway, Central Connecticut State University

2-5 pm  Book Session: *The Author’s Intention*, by Jeff Mitscherling, Tanya DiTommaso and Aref Nayed
Speakers: Jeff Mitscherling, Gary Madison, Graeme Nicholson
Chair: Paul Fairfield, Queen’s University

5-7 pm  CSCP RECEPTION, Room SH 3320

**Sunday, May 29**

9-10 am  “Epiphany in Joyce and Narrative Identity”
Amanda Gibeault, Boston College
Chair: Efrat Shapir, Queen’s University

10-11 am  “Being A/In Question to Myself: Merleau-Ponty and the Language of Subjective Life”
Stuart J. Murray, University of Toronto
Chair: Michael Marder, New School for Social Research

11-12 noon  “Platonism of the People”? Pro and Contra Celsum”
Felix O’Murchadha, University of Galway
Chair: Antonio Calcagno, University of Guelph
12-1 pm LUNCH

1-2 pm "Logics of the Other: Edmund Husserl on Intersubjectivity"
Antonio Calcagno, University of Guelph
Chair: Brigitte Sassen, McMaster University

2-3 pm “The Violence of Words”
W.S.K. Cameron, Loyola Marymount University
Chair: Jeff Dudiak, King’s University College

3-5 pm Panel: Violence, Victimization and a Phenomenology of Evil
Speakers: Wendy Hamblet, Adelphi University, Diane Enns, McMaster University
Chair: Felix O’Murchadha, University of Galway

7:30-9:00 pm: Special Evening Session
“An Aesthetic Taste for Moral Metacritique”
David Allison, SUNY Stony Brook
Chair: Diane Enns, McMaster University

Monday, May 30

9-10 am “Derrida’s Impossible Gift; Nietzsche’s Generosity and Gratitude”
Lorraine Markoti, University of Calgary
Chair: Catriona Hanley, Loyola College

10-12 noon Joint Session with the International Institute for Hermeneutics: “Derrida’s Hermeneutic Interludes”
Speakers: Andrzej Wiercinski, International Institute for Hermeneutics
Sean McGrath, Mount Allison University
Boyd Blundell, Loyola University of New Orleans
Respondent: Gary Madison, McMaster University

12-1 pm LUNCH
1-2 pm Annual General Business Meeting

2-3 pm “Enjamber le cadaver; le problème ‘de la cohésion de la vie’ chez Heidegger et Ricoeur”
Zoran Jankovic, Institut catholique de Paris
Chair: John Beach, Université de Montréal

3-4 pm “John Macmurray and Kurt Wolff: Two postmodern thinkers who integrate ethics and epistemology”
Eleanor Godway, Central Connecticut State University
Chair: Shannon Foskett, University of Western Ontario
David B. Allison, "An Aesthetic Taste for Moral Metacritique"
Having freed himself from the injunctions of the traditional morality in the new Prefaces to Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche raises the subsequent issue as to the real conditions of their remarkable pervasiveness, their resistance to philosophical inquiry, their status as cultural givens, indeed, as "truths." He addresses these issues in another of his 1886 prefaces, the Preface to Daybreak, where his earlier autocritique is extended, as a metacritique, to the very nature of morality itself, understood as "the problem of morality"—effectively serving as a "critique of morality." Nietzsche terms this critical task "the self-sublation of morality," yet he recognizes that the impetus behind such a seemingly contradictory project is itself the effect of his own "conscience" -- a conscience that has in its turn been transformed by his own "artful prudence" and an "aesthetic aversion to idealism," into an "intellectual conscience." Ultimately, if only aesthetically, "we too, still remain pious."

John Beach: “Gadamer’s Approach to the Beginning of Philosophy”
In the Beginning of Philosophy, Gadamer integrates his unique interpretation of the Presocratics with his hermeneutic theory. In the first 10 pages Gadamer unfolds the dialectic of issues occasioned by the topic of the ‘beginning’ of philosophy (also a theme of the late Heidegger). This concise chapter borrows from the analysis of historical consciousness worked out 30 years earlier in the middle section of Truth and Method. My paper has two parts: a summary of Gadamer’s dialectical analysis of the concept of ‘beginning’; and second, a dialogue with Robert Dostal’s and Catherine Zuckert’s commentaries on Gadamer’s elucidation of the ‘beginning’. My debate with their interpretations attempts to clarify Gadamer’s position and demonstrate the complexity of this concise chapter. To participate, with Gadamer, in a dialogue with the early Greeks, is not only to connect with the beginning of Western philosophy, but also to connect with one’s own philosophical journey.

Antonio Calcagno, ”Logics of the Other: Edmund Husserl on Intersubjectivity”
In Section 49 of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Husserl sketches how one moves from the ego’s sphere of ownness to the intersubjective sphere of ownness of a community of egos he calls "We". The transcendental reduction reveals that egos are both identical as egos and share one common nature that Husserl describes as a community marked by one living with and for each other (miteinander und für einander). This paper will challenge Husserl’s claim by arguing:
1. A logical identification of egos as similar may produce a ‘common’ nature, a ‘We’, or ‘psychophysical men’, but it need not produce the experience of community marked by the experience of one “existing for and with” the other. In other words, the synthesis of categorial acts, combination and identification need not result in the peculiar unity of community.
2. Community is not part of nature and is not proper to monads.
3. Community is a peculiar experience that must be worked at and is the product of social acts.
4. Community is possible not only because of the willed work of identification, synthesis, Paarung or analogical apperception, but through willed and motivated acts (combined with the fundamental Ich kann”) to recognize the differences and gaps between egos. Non-identity is constitutive of community and is not something that must be overcome by identity. Rather, it must be allowed to flourish and make possible unity. Community is a responsible response to non-identity and difference.

W.S.K. Cameron, “The Violence of Words”
This paper takes up the suspicion that a tendency to violence might be inherent in the structure of language itself. Having introduced and rejected some obvious objections to describing language as violent, I briefly defend the relatively uncontroversial view that language itself can be violent. The second section takes up the more pressing question that then emerges: is language inevitably violent? As we will see, this view is tempting both for Heideggerian reasons and on the post-structuralist grounds suggested by Derrida and Eco. In response, I defend the following two claims: (i) that language not only can be used violently, but that it has an ineradicable tendency to violence; yet (ii) language is not violent as such. The view that language is inevitably violent generates unattractive theoretical and practical consequences – consequences we can avoid by invoking a more supple, historical understanding of the relation between concepts and experience.

Shannon Dea: “The Restricted Horizon: Gadamer’s Fear of Science”
It is the received view among hermeneuticists of science that Hans-Georg Gadamer had little to say about the so-called Naturwissenschaften. My paper argues that, on the contrary, Gadamer was deeply interested in natural science. I sketch the history of this interest as it occurs in biographical materials, and evince the ubiquity of mentions of natural science within
Gadamer’s oeuvre. Drawing in particular upon *Truth and Method*, I show that Gadamer both idealized science as objective and inductive, and demonized it as dangerous. While Gadamer’s combined idealization-demonization of the natural sciences clearly owes a debt to Heidegger, I argue that it also has origins in Bacon and Helmholtz.

**Diane Enns: “Yesterday’s Victim: Concerning the Violence of the Other”**

This paper explores an increasing and often unchallenged preoccupation with the perspective of the victim, found in contemporary discourses that theorize and valorize a marginalized Other, and in responses to the violence of yesterday’s victim; violence we currently seem to accept as a legitimate or justifiable political course of action. The resistance to a critique of counter-violence and of an “exalted” victimhood, raises complex questions regarding ethics, politics and justice. I seek to elaborate how the development of an ethical attitude in which responsibility to a victimized other has assumed overwhelming significance, and of a politics trapped in the binary logic of victim and perpetrator, obscure the very justice these discourses and practices attempt to pursue.

**Amanda Gibeault. “Epiphany in Joyce and Narrative Identity”**

There are convincing reasons to agree that our personal identity has a narrative structure. However, there are experiences that seem, at first glance, to resist being explained in terms of narrative. One such type of experience is epiphany, or sudden revelation. I argue that, in fact, epiphany is best explained by the narrative model since the sudden revelation can only really act as a transformative event when considered in a broader context of interpretation. This is best demonstrated by considering the role of epiphany in James Joyce’s literature, and in one scene of *Ulysses*, in particular.

**Eleanor Godway, “John Macmurray and Kurt Wolff: Two postmodern thinkers who integrate ethics and epistemology”**

I use the work of “continental” sociologist/poet/thinker Kurt Wolff (1912-2003) to introduce the ideas of an unfairly neglected Scottish philosopher, John Macmurray (1891-1976) whose lack of renown was due in large part to his affinity with the continental tradition. Macmurray’s radical reversal of the usual priority of thought over action is expressed by his thesis: “All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action is for the sake of friendship.” Kurt Wolff’s invention/discovery of the dual notion/event of “surrender and catch” is closely related to the phenomenological reduction, but it goes further because it incorporates value, and cannot be impersonal. He also identifies it as “cognitive love.”

**Wendy Hamblet: “Xenos, God and Monster: the Paradoxical Logic of Identity Construction”**

This paper seeks to provide a phenomenology of “homecraft,” offering insight into how facile justifications for violence occur at the homespace, and intimating how that violence can be overcome. It argues that breaking down simplistic categorizations (good-evil; belonging/nonbelonging; secure/dangerous) is a matter of gathering the unknown into the known. Casting off the dark visage of menace, retiring the machinery of war, throwing open the gates, exiting the fortress, and getting to know the stranger, can work to dispel the fears that promote violence against different others. Opening our doors and our hearts to the world of chaotic differences may present a risky prospect at the best of times, but if we cannot find the courage to overcome our obsessions with security, at every level of our “identity work” in the world, we are destined to commit the very evils that we dread from the monstrous stranger at our door.

**Zoran Jankovic, “Enjamber le cadaver: le problème ‘de la cohesion de la vie’ chez Heidegger et Ricoeur”**

Chez Heidegger le problème de la “cohésion de la vie” est résolu par le temps originaire du Souci. Pour Ricoeur, cette conception heideggérienne est insuffisante car, selon lui, l’ontologie fondamentale succombe à la tentation husserlienne, c’est à dire elle présuppose “l’unité de la vie” et du “soi” plutôt que de la prouver. Sur le fond de sa critique du temps chez Heidegger, Ricoeur propose de comprendre l’unité de la vie comme un “tissu de récits” et l’unité du soi comme l’unité narrative. Or, cette conception doit écarter la problématique de la mortalité et du temps mortel, et en dernière analyse, elle ne fait que transposer le problème, car, Ricoeur lui-même ne peut que supposer l’unité du récit sans jamais la prouver.

**Morny Joy: “‘Revisioning’ the Concept of Recognition: Reflections on the Work of Kelly Oliver, Paul Ricoeur, Luce Irigaray and the Canadian Supreme Court of Canada”**

In an article, “Beyond Recognition” (2000), Kelly Oliver discusses the problem with recognition. She criticizes a dialectic which incorporates a form of recognition that involves subjection and subordination. Oliver’s own conclusion is that ethics is possible only beyond recognition (2000:41-2). This paper is a response to Oliver’s indictment of recognition, inspired by my reading the recent work of Paul Ricoeur and Luce Irigaray which undertakes a contemporary revision of Hegel’s
understanding of recognition. These readings put into question the received ideas of Hegel’s master/bondsman interaction. Both Ricoeur and Irigaray, in their separate ways, endeavour to recast the notion of recognition in ways that interrogate Oliver’s conclusion that recognition is insufficient. They both attempt to restore recognition as a movement in a dynamics of equality and reciprocity, especially in human encounters, but also in the context of human rights and justice.

Matthew King: “Heidegger’s Etymological Method: Not Fencing Off, but Expanding the Field of the Word”
In this paper I aim to show that there is a method to Heidegger’s etymologies, and to examine that method’s assumptions and goals. Contrasting Heideggerian etymology with philosophical analysis, and against the view that Heidegger seeks to replace current concepts with “purer” archaic ones, I argue that the goal of etymology is to recover the full range of a word’s historical meaning, so as to restore our sense of the word’s inherent multivocity. On Heidegger’s view of language, words bring being to presence for us; thus the richer the meaning of a word, the more of being it may bring into view. Etymology is a means of overcoming our usual relation to language, in which we assume that words can be substituted for things without loss, and which therefore prevents the thing from presenting itself to us through language.

Lorraine Markoti, “Derrida’s Impossible Gift: Nietzsche’s Generosity and Gratitude"
This paper begins by addressing Derrida’s elaboration of the impossibility of the “gift,” the inevitable manner in which a gift becomes ensnared into a symbolic (if not an economic) system of exchange. Next, I examine Nietzsche’s notion of generosity. While Nietzsche is aware that acts of generosity may have dubious motives or problematic effects, he ultimately praises acts of generosity stemming from abundance. At the same time, he argues that being able to receive can also be a form of magnanimity and strength. Rather than seeing gratitude as opposed to giving, one might consider gratitude itself a form of giving insofar as it involves giving acknowledgement or giving thanks.

Stuart J. Murray, “Being A/In Question to Myself: Merleau-Ponty and the Language of Subjective life”
This paper examines the elliptical manner in which, for Merleau-Ponty, the self is given to itself, how the self is mis-en-question, a perpetual question for itself. I argue that within the rhetorical dimensions of Merleau-Ponty’s language, we find a productive opening in which the self is free to fashion itself through the very fluid terms of its self-giving. Instead of returning to a Husserlian notion of constitution, Merleau-Ponty has recourse instead to the notion of institution and its source in the life-world. Specifically, it is through institutions that a creative or even mythic (mytho-poietic) fashioning of the self can take place, ultimately suggesting a subject whose “institutional” language opens for it new terms for and new modes of subjective life.

Felix O’Murchadha, “Platonism of the People? Pro and Contra Celsum”
Nietzsche in his critique of Christianity in effect returns to a debate which lies at the origins of Christianity’s engagement with Greek philosophy. He attempts to collapse Christianity and Platonism while retrieving a more pure Greek thought in the Pre-Socratics. In effect Heidegger followed Nietzsche in this respect. Three elements then are to be separated out: Pre-Socratic Greek thought, Platonism, and Christianity. One of the early Christian fathers, Justin Martyr, argued that Platonism was a precursor of Christianity and that both were irreconcilable with paganism. Celsum, an early opponent of Christianity, attempted on the contrary to reconcile Platonism and “pagan” practice and distance both from Christianity. Nietzsche ironically is much closer to early Christians such as Justin martyr and Origen than to Celsum in this respect. In this paper I wish to show that Platonism and Christianity have fundamental differences in respect of the body (I), that therefore Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity as Platonic is true only in the historical sense that the dominant self-interpretation of Christians was Platonic (II), but that this self-interpretation was based on a fundamental misreading of Plato which Nietzsche accepted in its nineteenth century form (III), and that how mistaken this interpretation is can be seen precisely by re-examining the relation of Christian asceticism and the Christian account of the body (IV).