Thursday, October 29

2:00 PM–3:00 PM  
**Coffee and Registration (cash and cheque only)**  
Room H-765

**Owen Glyn-Williams**  
(DePaul University)  
3:00 PM–3:45 PM  
“Are the Oppressed ‘Weak’? Emancipation and Hermeneutic Communism”  
Room H-767  
Chair: Grant Yocom (Oakland University)

**Alla Al-Saji**  
(McGill University)  
“Decolonizing Bergson: The Temporal Schema of the Open and Closed”  
Room H-763  
Chair: Deborah Goldgaber  
(Louisiana State University)

**Fiona Utley**  
(University of New England)  
4:00 PM–4:45 PM  
“The Phenomenology of Trust and Interanimality”  
Room H-767  
Chair: Gabrielle Polce (Concordia University)

**Pierre-Alexandre Fradet**  
(ENS de Lyon/Université Laval)  
“L’importance de faire volte-face : Bergson et le sens commun”  
Room H-763  
Chair: Mélissa Thériault  
(Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières)

**Plenary Session:**  
**Kelly Oliver**  
(Vanderbilt University)  
5:00 PM–6:00 PM  
“Earth: Love It or Leave It?”  
Room H-767  
Chair: Shannon Hoff (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

**Reception**  
6:00 PM–8:00 PM  
Cloud Deck, Room 3.130, John Molson School of Business  
(1450 rue Guy, at the corner of Maisonneuve)
**Friday, October 30**

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Room</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>9:00 AM–</td>
<td>Coffee and Registration</td>
<td>H-765</td>
<td>Martina Ferrari (University of Oregon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coffee and Registration Room H-765</td>
<td>Emmanuel Chaput (Université d’Ottawa)</td>
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<td><strong>Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>9:30 AM–</td>
<td>“THE IMMEMORIAL TIME OF GENDER: MERLEAU-PONTY’S POLYMORPHIC MATRIX OF ORIGINAL PAST”</td>
<td>H-767</td>
<td>Emmanuel Chaput (Université d’Ottawa)</td>
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<td>10:15 AM</td>
<td><strong>“LA FIGURE FEUERBACHIENNE ET SA FONCTION SCHIZOÏDE CHEZ G. DELEUZE ET M. FOUCAULT”</strong></td>
<td>H-763</td>
<td>Emmanuel Chaput (Université d’Ottawa)</td>
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<td>9:30 AM–</td>
<td>Chair: Emilia Angelova (Concordia University)</td>
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<td><strong>Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize</strong></td>
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<td>10:30 AM–</td>
<td>“MEASUREMENT AS TRANSCENDENTAL-EMPIRICAL ÉCART: MERLEAU-PONTY ON DEEP TEMPORALITY”</td>
<td>H-767</td>
<td>David Morris (Concordia University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:15 PM</td>
<td><strong>“Nietzsche on the Soul as a Political Structure”</strong></td>
<td>H-763</td>
<td>Daniel I. Harris (Hunter College, CUNY)</td>
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<td>12:30 PM–</td>
<td>Lunch and Business Meeting (all are welcome)</td>
<td>H-767</td>
<td><strong>Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2:30 PM–</td>
<td>“DOES NATURE HAVE A FUTURE?”</td>
<td>H-767</td>
<td>Chris McGrath (Memorial University of Newfoundland)</td>
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<td>2:30 PM–</td>
<td><strong>“IN DEFENSE OF THE DIALOGICAL CLAIM TO TRUTH IN GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS”</strong></td>
<td>H-763</td>
<td>Christopher Gibson (University of Ottawa)</td>
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<td>3:15 PM</td>
<td><strong>Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize</strong></td>
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<td>Chris McGrath (Memorial University of Newfoundland)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chair: Michael Blezy (University of Toronto)</td>
<td>H-767</td>
<td><strong>Winner of the Graduate Student Essay Prize</strong></td>
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Plenary Session

JASON WIRTH
(SEATTLE UNIVERSITY)

“SCHELLING AND THE SATANIC: ON NATURENRichtung

Room H-767

Chair: Lorraine Markotic (University of Calgary)

Plenary Panel

“FUTURE EARTH, FUTURE LIFE, FUTURE PEOPLE: ENVIRONMENT AND VALUES”
Chair: David Morris (Concordia University)
Room H-767

MATTHIAS FRITSCH
(CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY)

“FUTURE PEOPLE: THE PROBLEM OF INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY”

Room H-767

LORRAINE CODE
(YORK UNIVERSITY)

“FUTURE EARTH: THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY VS. SCEPTICISM ABOUT FUTURE CLIMATE”

TED TOADVINE
(UNIVERSITY OF OREGON)

“OUR MONSTROUS FUTURES: GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ECO-ESCHATOLOGY”

6:45 PM

Dinner (on your own)

Saturday, October 31

9:30 AM–
10:00 AM

Coffee and Registration
Room H-765

CHARLES COOPER-SIMPSON
(UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

“HEGEL’S IDEALISM OF FINITE BEING”
Room H-767
Chair: Bruce Gilbert (Bishop’s University)

XANDER SELENE
(INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR)

“WHY THE AVANT-GARDISTE WORK IS NONORGANIC”
Room H-763
Chair: Philippe Lynes (Concordia University)
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<tr>
<td>11:00 AM–11:45 AM</td>
<td>“IS THE ‘I’ INVOLVED IN ATTENTION?”</td>
<td>STEFANO VINCINI <em>(University of Memphis)</em></td>
<td>Reflections on a Theme in Benjamin’s Early Thought</td>
<td>Room H-763</td>
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<td>Chair: Blake Scott <em>(Concordia University)</em></td>
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<td>11:00 AM–11:45 AM</td>
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<td>NATHAN ROSS <em>(Oklahoma City University)</em></td>
<td>“HOW IS CAPITALISM LIKE A RELIGION?”</td>
<td>Room H-763</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 AM–1:00 PM</td>
<td>“LE ’DEVIENS CELUI QUE TU ES’ DE NIETZSCHE”</td>
<td>MARIE-ANDRÉE RICARD <em>(Université Laval)</em></td>
<td>“TIMELY/UNTIMELY: THE RHYTHM OF THINGS AND THE TIME OF LIFE”</td>
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<td>Chair: Maxime Doyon <em>(Université de Montréal)</em></td>
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<td>1:00 PM–2:45 PM</td>
<td>Lunch (on your own)</td>
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<td>2:45 PM–3:30 PM</td>
<td>“SPATIALITY AND AGENCY: A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONTAINMENT”</td>
<td>KIRSTEN JACOBSON <em>(University of Maine)</em></td>
<td>“QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETICS AND THE SUBLIMITY OF EVENTS”</td>
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<td>Chair: John Russon <em>(University of Guelph)</em></td>
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<td>3:45 PM–4:30 PM</td>
<td>“TIMELY/UNTIMELY: THE RHYTHM OF THINGS AND THE TIME OF LIFE”</td>
<td>FELIX Ó MURCHADHA <em>(National University of Ireland)</em></td>
<td>“EMPIRICAL REALISM AND THE GREAT OUTDOORS: A CRITIQUE OF MEILLASSOUX”</td>
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<td>Chair: Sean McGrath <em>(Memorial University of Newfoundland)</em></td>
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<td>G. ANTHONY BRUNO <em>(University of Toronto-Scarborough)</em></td>
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<td>Chair: Peter Gratton <em>(Memorial University of Newfoundland)</em></td>
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<td>4:45 PM–5:45 PM</td>
<td>“INTERIORS: THE SPACE OF MEANING AND THE GREAT INDOORS”</td>
<td>STEVEN CROWELL <em>(Rice University)</em></td>
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<td>Chair: Marie-Eve Morin <em>(University of Alberta)</em></td>
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<td>7:00 PM</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
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**Plenary Session**

*Winner of the 2013 Symposium Book Award*

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<td>7:00 PM</td>
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<td>Sign up at the registration desk <em>by noon on Friday</em> for a common meal at Le Paris, 1812 Ste-Catherine Ouest</td>
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<td>(each person pays his or her own way; space is limited)</td>
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The CSCP executive committee would like to congratulate the recipient of the tenth annual Symposium Book Prize, Anthony J. Steinbock, for *Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart*, Northwestern University Press, 2014.

The CSCP executive committee would also like to congratulate the winner of this year’s graduate student essay prize, Martina Ferrari (University of Oregon), for “The Immemorial Time of Gender: Merleau-Ponty’s Polymorphic Matrix of Original Past.”

*Félicitations aux deux gagnants!*

The CSCP would like to thank the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible:  

*Our host*: Department of Philosophy, Concordia University

*Our sponsors*: Office of the Vice-President, Research and Graduate Studies; Department of Philosophy; President’s Office; David O’Brien Centre for Sustainable Enterprise (DOCSE); Department of Religion; Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Society and Culture (CISSC); Loyola College for Diversity and Sustainability; Department of Sociology and Anthropology; David Morris, Chair Research Grant

*Our organizers*: David Morris (Chair, Department of Philosophy), with the assistance of Blake Scott and Rawb Leon-Carlyle
Abstracts / Résumés

Alia Al-Saji (McGill University), “Decolonizing Bergson: The Temporal Schema of the Open and Closed.” I attend to the temporal schema of the open/closed by examining its elaboration in Bergson’s philosophy and critically parsing the possibilities for its destabilization. Though Bergson wrote in a colonial context, this context barely receives acknowledgement in his work. This obscures the uncomfortable resonances between Bergson’s late work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, and the temporal narratives that justify French colonialism. Given Bergson’s uptake by philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze and by contemporary feminist and political theorists (especially “new materialists”), a critical re-examination is called for. Two Sources not only introduces a new dichotomy into Bergsonian philosophy—that of open/closed—it puts an end to the movement of Bergsonian duration by defining its possibilities as goals already given in advance. By turning the tools of Bergsonian critique onto Two Sources, I propose an alternative to the open/closed—the concept of the “half-open”—creating the conditions for decolonizing duration.

G. Anthony Bruno (University of Toronto-Scarborough), “Empirical Realism and the Great Outdoors: A Critique of Meillassoux.” In After Finitude, Meillassoux seeks knowledge of reality independent of experience, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ fusion of thinking and being that proscribes independent access to either. For Meillassoux, this blocks an account of the meaning of ancestral statements about reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity in experience; (3) Kant’s revolution isn’t Copernican because his realism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges. (1) imposes a Cartesian reading, which explains Meillassoux’s false assumption that, for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects. (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality from our inability to experience without it. (3) casts Kant’s revolution as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. Viewing the transcendental turn through this portrayal, we can see why empirical realism grasps nothing less than the great outdoors.

Emmanuel Chaput (Université d’Ottawa), “La figure Feuerbachienne et sa fonction schizoïde chez G. Deleuze et M. Foucault : Quelques thèses pour une philosophie de l’histoire de la philosophie.” Partant de la critique foucaldienne de la conception hégélienne de l’histoire, critique inspirée par l’approche généalogique de Nietzsche, je propose d’une part de réfléchir sur les fondements d’une conception non linéaire du développement historique et plus particulièrement du développement de l’histoire de la philosophie et, d’autre part, je m’attarderai à l’examen critique, à partir d’une telle conception, de la figure du philosophe Feuerbach dans les travaux de Foucault ou encore de Deleuze. Nous verrons alors en quoi on peut y voir un angle mort dans la genèse même d’une conception non linéaire de l’histoire, conception revendiquée explicitement par Foucault, notamment dans Les Mots et les choses.

Lorraine Code (York University), “Future Earth: the Problem of Epistemic Responsibility vs. Scepticism about Future Climate.” This paper will examine how an insistence on achieved certainty as a sine qua non marker of valid knowledge in ecological-environmental epistemology, ethics and politics truncates scientific inquiry. It circumscribes, or disqualifies, even cautiously developed investigative experiments on whose outcomes investigation and action rely. The paper engages critically with US politician Mitt Romney’s insistence on uncertainty as an excusing factor in refusing to acknowledge the possibility that the implications of “climate change” need to be acknowledged in public environmental policy, and private lives.

Charles Cooper-Simpson (University of Toronto), “Hegel’s Idealism of Finite Being.” In this paper I examine Hegel’s claim that “ideal being is the finite as it is in the true infinite.” I argue that a proper understanding of the structure of the infinite, and the way in which the ideal is opposed to ‘reality’ (in the technical sense Hegel develops) can offer a significant insight into what it means for Hegel’s philosophy to be an ‘idealism,’ and why it can only be considered an idealism if it is also understood to be a realist philosophy. Furthermore, such an analysis will allow us to see the properly ontological consequence of Hegel’s position: that reality cannot be that which is simply present.
Steven Crowell (Rice University), “Interiors: The Space of Meaning and the Great Indoors.” This talk will be a phenomenological examination of certain aspects of space and spatiality, with the aim of identifying a concept of interiority or inwardness that is not a determination of space. The title plays off a concept from Meillassoux—the “Great Outdoors”—and its aim is to test the limits of recent attempts (here represented by Gunter Figal’s work) to develop a kind of phenomenological realism that escapes the supposedly idealistic trap of transcendental phenomenology. Reflecting on various ways in which something can be “in” something else, I argue that the essential aspect of subjectivity as performance—namely, normative commitment—is a kind of interiority that cannot be determined in spatial terms. A phenomenological realism must rest upon a transcendental condition that escapes it, one that I shall illustrate through Heidegger and Levinas: the Great Indoors.

Martina Ferrari (University of Oregon), “The Immemorial Time of Gender: Merleau-Ponty’s Polymorphic Matrix of Original Past.” In this paper, I tend to the concept of “immemorial past” or “time before time” as articulated in The Visible and the Invisible (1968) and argue that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh offers a rich resource for feminist theorizing, especially for the investigation of the “original past” of gender, that is, the polymorphous dimension of gender that grounds and coexists with the personal and present manifestations of gender. Following Megan Burke’s (2013) insight that anonymity is temporal through and through and that gender is a temporal achievement insofar as gender habits get sedimented at the level of anonymous past, I focus on the “immemorial past” of gender and argue that acknowledging the fecund negativity that grounds and makes possible the emergence of different gender expressions reveals the constitutive instability, dynamism, and polymorphism of gender.

Gaëlle Fiasse (McGill University), “Dialogue avec Paul Ricœur. Revisiter les pouvoirs d’agir de l’herméneutique du soi à la lumière de la capacité d’aimer.” Paul Ricœur, depuis ses écrits de jeunesse, s’est penché sur la question de l’amour et de l’amitié même si, de 1954 à ses derniers travaux, ses interlocuteurs ont changé. Cependant, Paul Ricœur n’a pas théorisé la capacité d’aimer en tant que « je peux aimer ». Dans Soi-même comme un autre, il insiste sur le « je peux parler », « je peux agir », « je peux raconter des récits dont l’histoire de ma vie », « je peux m’imputer mes actions comme leur véritable auteur ». Ces capacités concernent directement l’herméneutique du soi, puisqu’il s’agit d’un mouvement de réappropriation où se joue l’identité du soi « agissant et souffrant ». Je m’interrogerai sur la possibilité de thématiser le « je peux aimer » afin de ne pas réduire l’amour à la passivité. Cette hypothèse de recherche visera à répondre aux différents auteurs qui appellent à repenser une anthropologie des capacités selon l’expression de Martha Nussbaum, ouvertes à la vulnérabilité. “Dialogue with Paul Ricœur. Revisiting his hermeneutics of the self. Is the capacity to love a power of action?” The question of love and friendship appears in Ricœur’s early texts, and continues to be present in his last works, even though his interlocutors are not the same. However, Ricœur did not develop the theme of the capacity to love as « I can love ». In Oneself as another, he insists on « I can speak », « I can act », « I can recount the story of my life », « I can impute my actions to myself as their author ». These capacities directly concern the hermeneutics of the self, since they refer to a movement of reappropriation where the question of identity is at stake, the identity of a self who is « acting and suffering ». I will examine the possibility of developing the « I can love » in order to avoid reducing love to passivity. The hypothesis of my research aims at answering to different authors who would like to see an anthropology of capabilities, according to the expression of Martha Nussbaum, open to vulnerability.

Pierre-Alexandre Fradet (ENS de Lyon/Université Laval), “L’importance de faire volte-face : Bergson et le sens commun.” Concept à significations multiples, le sens commun désigne chez Bergson tantôt un contenu de croyances naïves et répandues (acception objective), tantôt l’effort par lequel on fait un tri parmi les croyances et s’adapte au cours mouvant des choses (acception pratique). En serrant de près ces deux significations principales, je chercherai ici à jeter un éclairage sur l’apport philosophique que Bergson attribue par moments au sens commun, à l’encontre des diverses interprétations qui insistent volontiers sur la dévalorisation bergsonienne de ce concept. Il s’agira, pour être plus précis, de faire ressortir à quel point Bergson développe une conception positive du sens commun lorsqu’il
He pursues an account according to which the unity of personhood is borne out of a coherent organization among metaphysical accounts of the subject. Nietzsche means not Daniel's vision of emancipation at work in the idea of 'hermeneutic communism'.

While I seek to affirm the emancipatory character of their account of hermeneutics, in this paper I question whether necessary trajectory of capitalist development, figures like Evo Morales and the now deceased Hugo Chavez – to the 'thought of the weak', a modality of thinking suited to the emancipation of oppressed peoples around the globe. Whereas the global forces of domination marshal a fatalistic ‘politics of description’, which seeks to impose a developmental narrative that explains where history must go, Vattimo and Zabala argue that the historical vantage of the weak fundamentally resists the developmental ‘truths’ imposed on them by insisting on alternatives to the ‘framed’ order of ‘democratic’ capitalism. To the extent that Latin America’s various ‘left’ governments – led by figures like Evo Morales and the now deceased Hugo Chavez – have resisted acquiescence to the purportedly necessary trajectory of capitalist development, it is seen as a paradigmatic expression of hermeneutic communism. While I seek to affirm the emancipatory character of their account of hermeneutics, in this paper I question whether communism as the State-led defense of the weak makes good on what they call its ‘anarchic vein’. Looking to the work of Jacques Rancière, I suggest that an account of the construction of alternative forms of political subjectivity on the part of the weak themselves would strengthen both the claim that hermeneutics is inherently ‘anarchic’, and the vision of emancipation at work in the idea of ‘hermeneutic communism’.

Daniel Harris (Hunter College, CUNY), “Nietzsche on the Soul as a Political Structure.” A harsh critic of metaphysical accounts of the subject, Nietzsche means not to do away with the subject entirely, but to reimagine it. He pursues an account according to which the unity of personhood is borne out of a coherent organization among
drives and yet is not something other than that organization. To be a self is to mold the disparate aspects of one’s being into something whole, and the problem Nietzsche identifies is to make sense of this process without appeal to a separate force which molds. I suggest Nietzsche’s interest in Greek agonistic norms of contest sheds light here. Agonistic relationships, insofar as they foster and render meaningful contest among diverse forces, are for Nietzsche one appropriate model for the subjectivity of beings whose psychology is similarly characterized by contest among diverse forces the organization of which can make for meaningful lives, that is beings like us.

Kirsten Jacobson (University of Maine), “Spatiality and Agency: A Phenomenology of Containment.” I offer a phenomenological description of spatial experience as a basis for showing the role that spatial experience plays in our very make-up as free agents living healthy and meaningful lives. Through the consideration of a number of specific examples of spatial experience— the experiences of claustrophobia, solitary confinement, and therapeutic holding—I show that our formation as free agents is fundamentally dependent upon the gestures by which we come to develop a lived sense of whether the world outside us is supportive and cooperative, or hostile and threatening. I conclude from this that healthy human agency depends upon the cultivation of an appropriately supportive spatial environment.

Sean McGrath (Memorial University of Newfoundland), “Does Nature Have a Future?” The concept of the Anthropocene is misleadingly tied to the trope of “the death of nature” in contemporary environmental discourse. The two in no way logically implicate one another. This is demonstrated by the persistence of a vague notion of nature in ecology and popular environmentalism, nature as a symbol which still calls to us in this age of total technology, and which resists all efforts to deconstruct it. By thinking more clearly about what we actually mean by this concept, we put ourselves in a position to carry the concept of nature forward into the Anthropocene, that is, to conceive of an anthropocenic nature, one the future of which depends upon us as much as we depend upon it.

Gil Morejón (DePaul University), “Quasi-Transcendental Aesthetics and the Sublimity of Events: On Jacques Rancière’s Agonistic Politics.” In this paper, I argue that Rancière’s vision of politics is best understood as a materialist reformulation of Kant’s disjunction between determining and reflective judgment. For Rancière, as I show, politics is a matter of contesting the logic and limits of what counts as sense within a given régime, or in other words of contesting the sensus communis. I argue that Rancière’s reformulation of the Kantian schema turns on the former’s insistence upon the contingent, social and historical status of the lawfulness according to which a representation is possible, which I call ‘quasi-transcendental aesthetics’. Politics then consists, for Rancière, in forcing an appearance which sublimely exceeds these contingent laws. I conclude the piece by asking after the stakes of Rancière’s apparent affirmation of the necessary and ineradicable status of the police, which seems to assert the impossibility or inadequacy of any substantive structural political transformation.

David Morris (Concordia University), “Measurement as Transcendental-Empirical Écart: Merleau-Ponty on Deep Temporality.” Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection conceptualizes the transcendental and the empirical as intertwined, emerging only via an écart. I advance this concept of transcendental-empirical écart by studying the problem of measurement in science, in both general and quantum mechanical contexts. Section one analyses measurement, focusing on issues of temporality, to show how measurement entails a transcendental that intertwines/diverges with the empirical. Section two briefly interprets this result via Merleau-Ponty’s concept of depth, showing how measurement reveals temporality as not being an already given ground guaranteeing the transcendental in advance: temporality is instead ‘deep’, itself involving an écart of transcendental and empirical operations. Section three shows how this challenges Meillassoux’s claims about correlationism and phenomenology.

Felix Ó Murchadha (National University of Ireland), “Timely/Untimely: The Rhythm of Things and the Time of Life.” This paper presents an understanding of time and temporality as adverbial. Adverbially understood, time is experienced as timely and/or untimely. Such timeliness/untimeliness experienced as rhythm; indeed music can be
understood as a type of phenomenological reduction, reducing phenomena to their acoustical constituents, exposing the rhythmic constitution of temporal experience. Drawing on the work of Nancy and Lefebvre, amongst others, this paper articulates the different rhythms of timely/untimely figures – the prophet, the opportunist and the lover. It shows time as a living rhythm between the ‘energy of beginnings’ and mechanicity. Listening, we hear in terms of virtualities: each rhythm renews the relation to its beginning or lapses into mechanical repetition. In this sense the timely/untimely discloses time as a continual return to a past which was never present, a past which shows itself in every repetition, tracing a source more original than any time.

**Kelly Oliver (Vanderbilt University), “Earth: Love It or Leave It?”** The first images of Earth from space taken by the Apollo missions met with contradictory responses that are telling in relation to the problems of globalization and the environmental movement today. In *Earth: Love it or Leave it*, Kelly Oliver shows how the “autoimmune” response to seeing the Earth from space signals the need to rethink our bond to the Earth, our status as earthlings, and our relationships with Earth’s co-inhabitants.

**Marie-André Ricard (Université Laval), “Le « deviens celui que tu es » de Nietzsche.”** Mon objectif sera de dégager à la fois le sens, le statut et la portée de cette injonction centrale de la pensée morale nietzschéenne. Pour plusieurs, elle se résume à une exhortation à affirmer son moi de manière esthétique, laissée ainsi au bon goût (ou pouvoir) de chacun. Je vais plutôt tenter de montrer qu’elle abrite un véritable « tu dois » dont la nature se situe en fait à la croisée de l’esthétique et de l’éthique. Se fondant non dans le moi, mais dans un désir d’être que Nietzsche tient pour universel, la nécessité pour chaque être humain de se réaliser se double d’une dimension de responsabilité qui concerne aussi, même si seulement indirectement, les autres, présents et à venir. En un mot, le souci artistique de « bien dire et bien faire » d’abord appliqué à la configuration de la vie personnelle se lie ici à la vertu comprise comme un « faire du bien » supra-individuel.

**Nathan Ross (Oklahoma City University), “How is Capitalism like a Religion? Reflections on a Theme in Benjamin’s Early Thought.”** This paper examines Walter Benjamin’s early philosophy of capitalism. It starts from the thesis that capitalism is a cultic religion organized around debt, which I explain through mass psychology and surplus labor. Then I examine the figure of inflation in Benjamin’s philosophy, especially his ‘Imperial Panorama,’ arguing that inflation represents a tendency for material relations of exchange to dominate structures of experience.

**Xander Selene (Independent Scholar), “Why the Avant-Gardiste Work Is Nonorganic.”** Peter Bürger defines the avant-garde work as “nonorganic.” By this he means a work whose parts are no longer subordinate to the whole. Although this definition is largely inspired by Theodor W. Adorno, Bürger denies that Adorno’s aesthetics is a theory of the avant-garde. For Bürger, the nonorganic work is avant-garde because it liberates political contents of artworks for praxis. But Adorno does not think that “commitment” makes a work advanced. Nonetheless, Adorno’s rejection of organicism was deeply political. With reference to the propaganda of Alfred Rosenberg, I show that organicism formed the official ideology of National Socialism. Organicism had not always been associated with racializing ideology, but it is compatible with it, thus facilitating the Nazi recuperation of organicist thinkers like Goethe for fascism. I conclude with an interpretation of the 1928 essay “Schubert,” in which Adorno praises the composer in the language of inorganicity.

**Ted Toadvine (University of Oregon), “Our Monstrous Futures: Global Sustainability and Eco-Eschatology”**

Current efforts toward global sustainability extrapolate from deep-past trends to predict and manage deep-future scenarios, tacitly assuming that our responsibility toward future generations is to sustain the world in a state that as much as possible resembles our present. Meanwhile, speculative fiction, and contemporary culture more generally, is obsessed with the end of the world, multiplying apocalyptic visions of environmental collapse. The first approach, by endorsing what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the “catastrophe of equivalence,” domesticates the future and obscures the incommensurability of what resists substitution, conversion, or exchange. The second, while perhaps respecting the
monstrosity of the to-come, recuperates an ultimate end for the world through the promise of apocalypse or apotheosis. Yet speculative fiction may also invite an encounter with what remains indestructible, the “there is” of existence beyond any ultimate finality or anthropocentric sense. This points toward an anachronicity at the heart of things, an immemorial exposure of the elements that reorients both the sense of the world and our responsibilities in the deep present.

Fiona Utley (University of New England, Australia), “The phenomenology of trust and interanimality.” The distinction between trust and reliance has often been used to sharpen accounts of trust as having moral provenance and in such accounts animal others occupy a hazy middle ground. In seeking to differentiate trust from reliance, a number of claims differentiating humans and animals are made, yet there is clearly the sense of overlapping lifeworlds and rhythms of behavior and the recognition that we do have some form of obligation towards this other. I suggest that in seeing trust as particular to a human realm, accounts of trust have contributed to the exceptionalism of the human species. I explore an account of trust that differentiates trust and reliance through the notion of depth and, in acknowledging trust’s immemorial past, situates animals on the side of life.

Stefano Vincini (University of Memphis), “Is the ‘I’ involved in attention?” The goal of the paper is to answer the question of whether the “I,” as the subjective pole of experience, is an indispensable factor in the phenomenon of attention. In the phenomenological tradition, egological theories affirm the necessity of an “I”-involvement, whereas non-egological theories deny it. The paper is divided into four main sections. In the first, I characterize the particular notion of “I” that determines the meaning of the question. In the second, I present the egological theory of attention defended by Husserl in Ideas I. In the third, I discuss Gurwitsch non-egological theory. In the fourth, I criticize Gurwitsch’s view and I argue for an egological account in the wake of other texts by Husserl.

Jason Wirth (Seattle University), “Schelling and the Satanic: On Naturvernichtung.” This essay takes up the figure of Satan in Schelling’s late writing (1809-1854) as a way of developing a richer understanding of what Schelling called Naturvernichtung or the annihilation of nature. In so doing, I will also attempt to develop the prophetic dimension of Schelling’s thinking. This dimension includes a critical reappraisal of the past in order to liberate utopian possibilities of the future as well as critique the practices of modernity, especially with regard to the mounting ecological crisis, which Schelling could already see developing in the early 19th Century.

As Dante confirmed for Schelling, the only reawakening to a future paradise runs straight through the inferno of the past, a path that therefore demands that we confront the satanic. Perhaps he failed, but Schelling endeavored to take up the prophetic voice, to liberate a different future by exorcising our relationship to nature and to do so demanded that he go straight into the primordial abyss of hell.

I am fully aware that to contemporary sensibilities such language sounds resoundingly quaint, and no doubt we are called to find new ways of liberating Schelling’s insight. Nonetheless, it is my hope here to defend the thrust of the central elements of the manner in which Schelling prophetically framed what has matured into the contemporary ecological crisis. The crisis of what Schelling called Naturvernichtung—our growing oblivion to the question of nature—demands not only that we recover the question of nature, but that we also understand its original loss as, in the language of a new mythology, satanic. In other words, our increasing awareness of Naturvernichtung as constitutive of who we now are is simultaneously a revelation of radical evil.