

# Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy La société canadienne du philosophie continentale

The University of Maine, Orono, ME  
September 28-30, 2023



## Thursday, September 28

1:00 pm- 5:00 pm	Registration The Maples	
2:00 pm- 2:45 pm	<p>Ryan Bingham (University of Chicago)</p> <p>"Derrida, différance, and a Materialism without Substance"</p> <p>*Graduate Prize Co-Winner ROOM: Virtue Room, Maples Chair: TBD</p>	<p>Abram Capone (Loyola University Chicago)</p> <p>"Musicking Queerly: An Embodied, Relational Account of Music"</p> <p>ROOM: Weisz Room, Maples Chair: TBD</p>
3:00 pm- 3:45 pm	<p>David Morris (Concordia University)</p> <p>"The Asymmetry of Being and the Temporizing of Time in Simondon"</p> <p>ROOM: Virtue Room, Maples Chair: Shannon Hoff (Memorial University)</p>	<p>Caleb Faul (University of North Dakota)</p> <p>"Inside Art: Interior Design and the Inhabitation of Artworks"</p> <p>ROOM: Weisz Room, Maples Chair: Sean Lopez (The University of Maine)</p>
4:00 pm- 4:45 pm	<p>Shannon Hoff (Memorial University)</p> <p>"A Phenomenological Account of the Conditions of Transnational Feminism"</p> <p>ROOM: Virtue Room, Maples Chair: Jessica Miller (The University of Maine)</p>	<p>Benjamin Décarie-Daigneault (Pennsylvania State University)</p> <p>"The Crooked Finger of Chauvet-Pont d'Arc: A Merleau-Pontian Account of Parietal Art"</p> <p>*Graduate Prize Co-Winner ROOM: Weisz Room, Maples Chair: Carla Billitteri (The University of Maine)</p>
5:00 pm- 6:00 pm	<p>Plenary Session Mariana Ortega (Pennsylvania State University)</p> <p>"Carnal Light and Border Crossing, Sensing a Photographic Archive of Feeling Brown"</p> <p>ROOM: Deering Hall 113 Chair: Laura McMahon (Eastern Michigan University)</p>	
6:30 pm- 8:30 pm	<p>Reception Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, The University of Maine Orono Brewing Company, 61 Margin St., Orono</p>	

## ***Friday, September 29***

9:00 am-

**Coffee and Registration**

9:30 am

The Maples

**Panel: *Interpretations of Heidegger***

**ROOM: Virtue Room, Maples**

*Chair:* Nathan Stormer (The University of Maine)

**Panel: *Approaches to Ethics Through Relational Theories***

**ROOM: Weisz Room, Maples**

*Chair:* Alejandro Strong (Apeiron Expeditions)

9:30 am-

John Hacker-Wright

Rene Ramirez

10:10 am

(University of Guelph)

(Loyola University Chicago)

"Heidegger on Courage"

"Indigenous Localized Ethics and Land Back"

10:15 am-

Joshua Fahmy-Hooke

Gina Lebkuecher

10:55 am

(Memorial University)

(Loyola University Chicago)

"The Formally Indicative Method in Martin Heidegger's  
Early Freiburg Lectures (Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen,  
1919–1923)"

"Body as Cultural Situation: On Freedom, Gender,  
and the Ethical Implications of Beauvoir's  
Phenomenology"

11:00 am-

Brandon Kaiser

Lillianne John

11:40 am

(Boston College)

(Loyola University Chicago)

"Heidegger's Apocalyptic Destiny"

"Ethics for a Multicultural World, Through Critical  
Hermeneutics"

12:00 pm-

***Plenary Session:***

Grégori Jean

1:00 pm

(Université Côte d'Azur)

"Les quatre points cardinaux de la phénoménologie française contemporaine"

ROOM: Nutting Hall 100

*Chair:* Antonio Calcagno (King's University College at Western University)

1:00 pm-

**Lunch and Business Meeting**

2:45 pm

Virtue Room, Maples

***Plenary Panel***

Don Beith

3:15 pm-

(The University of Maine)

4:30 pm

"Experiential, Embedded, Engaged: Rethinking Philosophical Education"

Susan Bredlau

(The University of Maine)

"Who Am I Meant To Be? Some Thoughts About Teaching and Being Taught Ethics"

ROOM: Nutting Hall 100

*Chair:* Linda Silka (The University of Maine,  
Senator George J. Mitchell Center for Sustainability Solutions)

4:45 pm-

***Plenary Session***

Claire Colebrook

5:45 pm

(Pennsylvania State University)

"End of the Archive, End of the World"

ROOM: Nutting Hall 100

*Chair:* Don Beith (The University of Maine)

## Saturday, September 30

9:00 am-

Coffee and Registration

9:30 am

The Maples

9:30 am-

10:15 am

Sage Cugino

(Toronto Metropolitan University)

"Gender Insecurity: Butler and Laing on the Psychological

Roots of Anti-Trans

Violence"

ROOM: Virtue Room, Maples

Chair: Kym Maclaren (Toronto Metropolitan University)

Sarah Carey

(Pennsylvania State University)

"Beyond Derrida's 'Instant of Death': Theorizing the

Cruel Instance of Death Row"

ROOM: Weisz Room, Maples

Chair: Hao Hong (The University of Maine)

### Panel: *Being-Unhomed, Double-Binds, and Being-Disciplined: Ex-Prisoners on Prison, Re-Entry, and Resistance*

ROOM: Neville Hall 108

Chair: Kirsten Jacobson (The University of Maine)

Kym Maclaren

(Toronto Metropolitan University)

"Being-at-Home and Being-Unhomed in Prison"

Drew Leder

(Loyola University Maryland)

"The Paradoxes and Double-Binds of 'Re-entry'"

*Responses From Previously Incarcerated Individuals*

Zakaria Amara

(Writer, and Consultant for ETAtoronto.ca)

Randall Bagley

(Georgetown University Prisons and Justice Initiative Alumnus)

Rachel Fayter

(Ph.D. Candidate, University of Ottawa)

12:45 pm-

2:00 pm

Lunch (on your own)

2:00 pm-

3:15 pm

Bruce Gilbert

(Bishop's University)

"The Ethical Call and Glory in Hegel and Levinas"

ROOM: Virtue Room, Maples

Chair: Steven Evans (The University of Maine)

Antonio Calcagno

(King's University College at Western University)

"On the Possibility of the Affectivity of the State and Its

Feelings: Edith Stein's Political Phenomenology"

ROOM: Weisz Room, Maples

Chair: John Hacker-Wright (University of Guelph)

3:30 pm-

4:15 pm

John Russon

(University of Guelph)

"Authenticity and Aging"

ROOM: Neville Hall 108

Chair: Susan Bredlau (The University of Maine)

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**Plenary Panel: Co-Winners of the 2021 Symposium Book Prize**

ROOM: Neville Hall 108

*Chair:* David Morris (Concordia University)

Ian Angus

(Simon Fraser University)

“Ontology of Living Labour and the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction”

Bettina Bergo

(Université de Montréal)

“Anxiety in Philosophy, Anxiety in Political Action: Affects and Reasoning, Persons and Groups”

Lorenzo Simpson

(Stony Brook University)

“Towards a Negative Hermeneutics: The Hermeneutics/Critical Debate in a New Register”

4:30 pm-

6:45 pm

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7:30 pm

**Conference Dinner (participants pay their own way)**

Oriental Jade Restaurant & Bar, located in Bangor Beer Company, 320 Bangor Mall Blvd, Bangor

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## **Acknowledgements**

The CSCP would like to acknowledge the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible.

*Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur soutien :*

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Don Beith

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Guillaume Boucher (Université de Montreal)

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## ***Abstracts***

**Ian Angus (Simon Fraser University), “Ontology of Living Labour and the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction.”** From the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the present, philosophy has grappled with the domination of received form over ongoing experience and has proposed a return to the concrete in order to ally itself with social and intellectual liberation. *Groundwork of Phenomenological Marxism* identifies three historical phases of this task: the first associated with Karl Marx takes political economy as its object and projects the liberation of labour; the second associated with Edmund Husserl takes mathematical physics as its object and projects the liberation of philosophy and the human sciences from objectivism; the third takes ecology as its object and projects its central role in the rehabilitation of experienced nature from its objectivistic reduction to a resource—whose latest critical phase consists in the contemporary war between planetary technology and place-based Indigeneity. In this overview of several aspects of that work, I will begin with the teleological convergence of Karl Marx and Edmund Husserl on an ontology of living labour. Then, through a critique of Marx’s occlusion of natural fecundity, I will show how a completion of a new form of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, announced by Husserl in his late work, grounds a conception of philosophy that is intercultural, autobiographical, and describes the opening of a world.

**Bettina Bergo (Université de Montréal), “Anxiety in Philosophy, Anxiety in Political Action: Affects and Reasoning, Persons and Groups.”** For decades, the dialogue between psychology, psychoanalysis and philosophy was carried on, in Continental philosophy, thanks to Merleau-Ponty and many others. To be sure, philosophers of all stripes have tended to epistemologize affects, asking: are affects necessarily conscious; are affects incipient judgments, are these unique *kinds* of judgments? Fair enough. But the entire rationalist tradition, alive and well today, approaches affects either in terms of reason, generally as somewhat deficient reason, or in terms of unconscious processing or becoming-conscious. I’ll come back to that. My task, in trying to write a history of anxiety, as theme and strategy of philosophy, was to read anxiety *not* as a servant to reason, but for itself, as central theme—and to ask how anxiety figured in successive waves of philosophy, and sometimes as the beyond of reason, or its symptom. Having presented what is an overview of *Anxiety: A Philosophical History*, I turn to social psychology and address a question of ongoing interest to me: what of anxiety in crowds? And, do crowds act according to a ‘logic’ of their own, are they simply individuals ‘writ large’ as Plato argued for the *polis*, or are both instances true—with crowds capable of a logic of their own *and* composed of individuals?

**Ryan Bingham (University of Chicago), “Derrida, différance, and a Materialism without Substance.”** In the final chapter of his 1993 *Specters of Marx*, Jacques Derrida ventures to write in favor of a certain materialism, a “materialism without substance: a materialism of the *khôra* for a despairing ‘messianism.’” Here, I investigate the relationship between the spatiotemporal configuration of these paired figures and Derrida’s early notion of *différance*. I begin by outlining for the first time Derrida’s early, unpublished, 1961 interpretation of *khôra*. I then track its implicit convergence with Derrida’s early engagement with messianic eschatology, in published and unpublished texts from 1962–1963, in order to draw out the significance of *khôra* and the messianic in the emergent articulation of *différance*. Remarkably, at the moment in which Derrida developed the major initial gestures of deconstruction, this “chiasm” was before him—both *avant* and *devant*—such that a deconstruction responsible for the conditions of its own inscription would have to come to articulate this chiasm.

**Antonio Calcagno (King’s University College at Western University), “On the Possibility of the Affectivity of the State and Its Feelings: Edith Stein’s Political Phenomenology.”** I argue here that Edith Stein’s discussion of the state may be read as including a discussion of feeling, and though one could limit the discussion of the role of feelings within the framework of the human person or subject that carries the state within themselves as a *Staatsträger*, namely, as part of the underlying personal communal sociality of the state, I maintain that the state itself, as a phenomenological object, carries within it an important and constitutive feeling necessary for its very condition of possibility. Justice and a feeling (*Rechtsgefühl*) for what is right is fundamental for the state to establish its own sovereign right to shape itself rightly and justly.

**Abram Capone (Loyola University Chicago), “Musicking Queerly: An Embodied, Relational Account of Music.”** Traditional philosophic approaches to defining music are often unsatisfyingly restrictive or unsatisfyingly vague. I suggest that these issues are caused by an overarching problem in philosophy of music: a tendency to treat musical works as objects analogous to work-objects in the plastic arts. I draw on work by queer musicologist Suzanne Cusick to suggest that musical works are more fruitfully understood as relationships and music as a relational mode or particular way that subjects relate to one another and the world. Despite Cusick’s assertion that music is a particular kind of relational and corporeal activity, her essays omit a discussion of embodiment as such. I offer a brief discussion of embodiment and construct a few analogies to help refocus philosophic discussion about musical works from the object-paradigm and toward an active, relational account of music.

**Sarah Carey (Pennsylvania State University), “Beyond Derrida’s ‘Instant of Death’: Theorizing the Cruel Instance of Death Row.”** This paper extends Derrida’s Death Penalty seminars, going beyond Derrida’s focus on the “instant of death” to argue that we must also attend to the cruelty of the prolonged instance of death row. I assess Derrida’s warnings about the dangers of abolitionist appeals to cruelty as well as his insistence that the cruel moral violation of the death penalty occurs at the moment of execution. Supplementing

the seminars with Derrida's analysis of Blanchot's near-death experience in *Demeure*, I contend that understanding the intolerable cruelty of the death penalty requires we look beyond the calculated instant of death. Instead of understanding cruelty as taking time away from the condemned prisoner at the instant of execution, I propose that we should understand cruelty as giving time. Cruelty takes place during the interminable instance the condemned prisoner spends waiting on death row in a death without death and life without life.

**Claire Colebrook (Pennsylvania State University), "End of the Archive, End of the World."** Jacques Derrida argued that there was already, within Plato, a distinct sense that what made reason possible – writing, technics, memory – exposed reason to corruption: "we" could all become like those chained in the cave captured by shadows. The writing that preserves and stores the truths of reason could also become inert, passive and inhuman. It is worth asking why this implicit sense of integral fragility becomes increasingly explicit *and* why the sense of the archive in general becomes tied to a quite specific archive – the Western canon of books and artworks. Why did the end of the world increasingly become figured *not* as an apocalyptic erasure of the contingency of the present but instead the end of the archive, the end of *us* and the end of all sense and value? How did truth and the world become bound to what now understands itself to be "the human"? How did the archive and the possibility of collective sense become tied to the particular objects of the West – books, statues, images and songs?

**Sage Cugino (Toronto Metropolitan University), "Gender Insecurity: Butler and Laing on the Psychological Roots of Anti-Trans Violence."** In this paper I give an account of why trans and gender non-conforming people are especially subjected to violence for their transgression of gender norms, compared to other groups that also transgress these norms. By drawing on Judith Butler's analysis of gender performativity, I argue that trans and gender non-conforming people reveal the truth of gender: that it is constituted by action alone. In doing so, trans and gender non-conforming people disrupt the framework by which many people understand gender. By turning to R.D. Laing's account of human psychology in *The Divided Self*, I then argue that those who respond violently to trans and gender non-conforming people do so because they are particularly reliant upon a rigid framework for understanding gender in order to ground their ontological security.

**Benjamin Décarie-Daigneault (Pennsylvania State University), "The Crooked Finger of Chauvet-Pont d'Arc: A Merleau-Pontian Account of Parietal Art."** This paper explores the possibility of a non-interpretational reading of artifacts inherited from "pre-historical" humanity. I argue that beyond our efforts at decrypting the meaning of vestiges of the past lies the possibility for us to engage in a dialogical, ethical relationship with the deep past. I do so by analyzing 32000-year-old handprints in the cave Chauvet-Pont d'Arc through Merleau-Ponty's notion of transtemporality, developed in the lectures on *Institution and Passivity*. The latter opens ways to think an intersubjectivity across time made possible by the coherent coexistence of multiple heterogeneous temporalities on a single plane. I mobilize Deleuze's concept of "encounter" to describe the handprints as disruptive traces of the past, susceptible of becoming doorways allowing us to join the other across the thickness of time by grasping their expressive intention in its nascent state.

**Joshua Fahmy-Hooke (Memorial University), "The Formally Indicative Method in Martin Heidegger's Early Freiburg Lectures (Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen, 1919–1923)."** My primary goal in this paper is to provide an accurate understanding of Martin Heidegger's formal indication. A complementary goal is a defensible account of its scattered elaboration in the *Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen*, 1919–1923. Disagreement regarding the meaning and validity of Heidegger's formal indication is sustained by its resistance to assimilate into his phenomenological project. Interpretations of formal indication as theoretical reflection or applied hermeneutics are unsatisfactory; they render the central supports uniformly deficient for different reasons. I argue a principled and unified interpretation is attainable, in part, because Heidegger's enigmatic uses show an overlooked link among them. In my view, Heidegger's formal indication characterizes the method that conditions the pre-theoretical grasp of ontic beings and the reflexive possibility for *Dasein* to actualize a principled account of existential Being (*Sein*). This result supports Heidegger's phenomenological breakthrough towards a sense of Being (*Sein*) presupposed by, but not reducible to, an object or the general character of objects as such (*Seiendes*, *Seiendheit*).

**Caleb Faul (Independent Scholar), "Inside Art: Interior Design and the Inhabitation of Artworks."** In this paper, I argue that interior design is exemplary for our understanding of the relationship between artworks and those of us who perceive them. Key to my argument is the phenomenological structure of inhabitation, for what distinguishes interior design as an artform is the fact that its products are inhabited rather than, say, looked at or listened to. In Part 1, I investigate Merleau-Ponty's repeated reliance on terminology having to do with inhabitation, showing that this terminology is used to describe phenomena as fundamentally interactive. In Part 2, I investigate interior design and domestic inhabitation themselves to reveal a similar structural interactivity. Finally, in Part 3, I argue that the interactivity that we find between inhabitant and inhabited space in interior design is also at work in our relationship to other artworks such as paintings. Thus, I do not so much look at paintings as I inhabit them.

**Bruce Gilbert (Bishop's University), "The Ethical Call and Glory in Hegel and Levinas."** Both Hegel and Levinas, as phenomenologists, attest to an ethical call that arises from beyond us yet which nonetheless irrevocably summons us to do the good, to

respect others, and to seek the truth. Were it not for a “metaphysical desire” for transcendence that seeks the infinite origin of this call, humanity would be condemned to endure a tragic abyss between human freedom and moral responsibility. However, by following this metaphysical desire we discover a new and very different form of freedom lived out in love and best characterized as “glory.”

**John Hacker-Wright (University of Guelph), “Heidegger on Courage.”** Heidegger is not often thought of in relation to teachings on virtue and possibly even less often thought of as having teachings concerning courage. Yet the interpretations of Aristotle offered in lectures prior to *Being and Time* show that Aristotle’s conceptions of virtue, fear, and courage, are important to the development of Heidegger’s thought. So, it’s worth asking whether there is a notion of virtue along with a conception of courage in *Being and Time*. Clearly, they don’t appear explicitly, since virtue [Tugend] is not used even once in *Being and Time* and courage [Mut] is used only once, but the point is that the concepts may appear in *Being and Time* under different guises. Exploring the issues of virtue and courage is crucial to evaluating and either accepting or rejecting Franco Volpi’s thesis that *Being and Time* can be taken to be a “translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.”

**Shannon Hoff (Memorial University), “A Phenomenological Account of the Conditions of Transnational Feminism.”** In *Decolonizing Universalism*, Serene Khader challenges what she calls “missionary feminism” for its assumptions that justice takes only one culturally specific form (“justice monism”) and that freedom is “Enlightenment freedom,” with which it deals out opposition to sexist oppression with one hand and imperialism with the other. She seeks to discern core values for transnational feminist praxis that condemn sexist oppression while grappling with the pluralism of practices of gender and familial and social relations. This paper argues that this account requires greater normative justification that phenomenology can provide, in its foundational descriptions of both interpersonal life and human singularity. It mobilizes the work of John Russon and Saba Mahmood in order to develop this normative support for Khader’s otherwise promising arguments.

**Grégori Jean (Université Côte d’Azur), “Les quatre points cardinaux de la phénoménologie française contemporaine.”** Après avoir semble-t-il traversé une période de relatif épuisement, la phénoménologie française connaît, depuis une dizaine d’années et l’émergence, chez des auteurs comme Renaud Barbaras, d’un paradigme « cosmologique », un très puissant regain de vitalité. Une telle situation, dont on ne peut évidemment que se réjouir, constitue toutefois un défi majeur pour les phénoménologues contemporains : celui de se doter d’une *boussole* permettant de s’orienter dans un paysage philosophique en pleine reconfiguration, et selon des principes qui échappent encore en grande partie à celles et ceux qui s’y engagent. Ce faisant, l’objectif de cette intervention sera double : d’une part, avancer une série d’hypothèses quant à la manière dont se structure aujourd’hui le champ phénoménologique français — cette topologie devant nous permettre d’élaborer une typologie *des* phénoménologies françaises contemporaines ; et d’autre part, tenter de déterminer le sens, les enjeux, mais aussi les *présupposés* de cette nouvelle « donne » philosophique, dont tout nous semble indiquer qu’elle demeure transitoire et, à ce titre, riche d’un avenir qu’il n’est pour l’heure possible que de pressentir.

**Lillianne John (Loyola University Chicago), “Ethics for a Multicultural World, Through Critical Hermeneutics.”** This paper argues that, given our interrelational and interdependent existence, we are ethically obligated to actively engage with and test our (Gadamerian) horizons for prejudices. I will first take up Gadamer’s concept of horizons and horizon-limiting prejudices, and show that our relative social privileges function as prejudices. I will then describe Butler’s critique of individualism, and connect their understanding of interdependence to our inescapable, non-ideal situation in the world. Given our contemporary, multicultural situations, I argue for a contextual and non-generalizable ethics of the non-ideal and the relational which is able to address both interpersonal and intercultural claims of injustice (and everything in between). I close the paper by providing short discussions about the cases of refusal to challenge one’s horizons.

**Brandon Kaiser (Boston College), “Heidegger’s Apocalyptic Destiny.”** This is an inquiry-driven paper that traces the development of Martin Heidegger’s political ordering to its ontological finality. This is the reclamation of Being from beings. It is one that unfolds as the complete and utter destruction of the Earth through the fulfillment of “machination” and “technological enframing.” Prior to this philosophical development, Heidegger played a role in ordering the German people behind the National Socialist movement. The Gleichschaltung, as it was called, was the process of getting all Germans on the same gear or circuit. This paper examines how Heidegger not only conceived of one form of ordering against another, but how he eventually came to see all politics as an outgrowth of machination. This analysis thus reveals the way in which Heidegger’s own political failure to become the spiritual leader of the Nazi party led him to an apocalyptic conclusion.

**Gina Lebkuecher (Loyola University Chicago), “Body as Cultural Situation: On Freedom, Gender, and the Ethical Implications of Beauvoir’s Phenomenology.”** How can we reconcile oppressive sociocultural systems with human agency in the “becoming” of gender? I argue that *The Second Sex* should be read in connection with Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics, and that it offers an existentialist phenomenology of sexual/gendered construction or situation. I provide an analysis of *The Second Sex*’s critical phenomenology and lay out two readings of Beauvoir’s phenomenology—one of “sexual difference,” and one of “body as cultural situation.” Arguing for the

latter, I explore the ethical/social-political actions this constructivist reading of Beauvoir calls us to take. This existentialist analysis of the phenomenological experience of gender demonstrates that gender is intersubjectively constructed, and indicates an ethical obligation to acknowledge and question how we choose to enact gender. It further invites us to transcend societal norms by exercising our freedom to create new means of gender/sexual expression.

**Drew Leder (Loyola University Maryland), "The Paradoxes and Double-Binds of 'Re-entry.'" Phenomenology understands the subject not as mere inwardness, but as emerging and developing within the world. In particular, it is in the context of a place that is one's own, that reflects, shelters and informs one's sense of self, that selfhood and agency are consolidated. This is one's home, and its sanctuary enables the self to venture into new territories and be transformed, to become. Prison, however, is designed to un-home a person. This paper reflects on the creative powers of prisoners to make homes even in the most unhoming of places, and explores the significance and structure of being-at-home through their experiences. Two ambiguities of home become evident: that it is both security and vulnerability, and that it both opens and closes one to becoming. Ex-prisoners highlight the importance of finding one's home in certain kinds of relationships with others in order to navigate these ambiguities.**

**Kym Maclaren (Toronto Metropolitan University), "Being-at-Home and Being-Unhomed in Prison." Phenomenology understands the subject not as mere inwardness, but as emerging and developing within the world. In particular, it is in the context of a place that is one's own, that reflects, shelters and informs one's sense of self, that selfhood and agency are consolidated. This is one's home, and its sanctuary enables the self to venture into new territories and be transformed, to become. Prison, however, is designed to un-home a person. This paper reflects on the creative powers of prisoners to make homes even in the most unhoming of places, and explores the significance and structure of being-at-home through their experiences. Two ambiguities of home become evident: that it is both security and vulnerability, and that it both opens and closes one to becoming. Ex-prisoners highlight the importance of finding one's home in certain kinds of relationships with others in order to navigate these ambiguities.**

**David Morris (Concordia University), "The Asymmetry of Being and the Temporizing of Time in Simondon." Simondon's Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information challenges any presupposition of individuals as ontologically basic, leading to an ontology of pre-individual being. Time is a pervasive theme of his argument, including provocative claims that time "emerges from the pre-individual." He never elaborates and there is very little treatment of time in scholarship, let alone through a Simondonian engagement with now current science. I elaborate his suggestions by: (1) echoing his method in refusing to explain the emergence of time by way of presupposing it; (2) engaging with recent quantum mechanical science. This leads to a twofold claim: (1) Pre-individual being cannot be claimed to have any symmetry in ontological or scientific senses. (2) Time is a contingent result of an individuation process and is better understood as "temporizing." We should say "it's timing" in the way we say "it's raining"—but temps/weather gusts (tempestuates) on cosmological scales.**

**Mariana Ortega (Pennsylvania State University), "Carnal Light and Border Crossing, Sensing a Photographic Archive of Feeling Brown." Bodies of color seeking refuge trek sometimes two thousand or more miles for up to three months under dangerous, violent conditions—walking dangerous paths and riding La bestia (The Beast), a number of freight trains moving from Mexico to the U.S.—in order to reach the Mexico-US border. In this presentation, I discuss Verónica Gabriela Cárdenas's latest series, *Del Rio*, which documents a 2021 Haitian migrant caravan. Following José Esteban Muñoz, I read the photographs as a carnal archive of "feeling brown." I discuss Muñoz's notion of feeling brown with attention to two main issues, brownness as shared sense of harm and brownness as commons. I read Cárdenas photographs as carnal in so far as they are the sensory circuits through which feeling brown is transmitted. This reading opens the possibility for an aesthetic unsettlement in which the Mexico-U.S. border may be reinterpreted so as to expand our understanding of border experience and avoid the invisibilizing of Black Latinidad. It also highlights the heterogeneous, communal, and coalitional aspect of feeling brown.**

**Rene Ramirez (Loyola University Chicago), "Indigenous Localized Ethics and Land Back." Brian Burkhardt's Localized Ethics, an indigenous ethical framework, rejects Eurocentric and delocalized accounts of abstract value as the basis for ethics. 'Value,' he argues, maintains Eurocentric, anthropocentric, and instrumental accounts of worth that undermine the sacredness inherent to every being. Indigenous cultures argue that a recognition of sacredness and equality requires one to be localized within a more-than-human community. This must understand that relationality is the essential feature of moral decision-making and behavior. I apply this ethical framework to a practical concern in Land Back and its inclusion/exclusion of the displaced. I argue that Burkhardt's Localized Ethics is useful in negotiating the political goal of returning land to indigenous peoples while also ethically engaging with non-indigenous people of color. This is because, according to this ethical framework one cannot generalize a single approach to this issue; rather, solutions must be bespoke to the community one is in relation with.**

**John Russon (University of Guelph), "Authenticity and Aging." I study this issue of authenticity in relation the phenomenon of adulthood and, more specifically, the phenomenon of aging. I begin with a phenomenological reflection on adulthood as a form of**



experience, focusing especially on the emotional and behavioural dimensions implicit in a mature engagement with reality. This leads into a reflection on the experience of aging as a gradual education into the nature of choice and the nature of time. I distinguish three ways of experiencing time: the intimate time of absorption, the indifferent time of the clock and the unique temporality of a 'time of life.' I explore in particular the distinctive existential significance of the 'midlife crisis' and argue that, through its engagement with nature of time, the midlife crisis has the capacity to reveal our finitude to us in an especially powerful way and by so doing to invite us to embrace our mortality authentically.

**Lorenzo Simpson (Stony Brook University), "Towards a Negative Hermeneutics: The Hermeneutics/Critical Debate in a New Register."** Paul Ricoeur's distinction between the hermeneutics of the recovery of meaning and the hermeneutics of suspicion is a suggestive way to conceptualize the relationship between Critical Theory and hermeneutics. While Critical Theorists are often viewed as being insufficiently hermeneutic, hermeneutics are just as often viewed as being insufficiently suspicious, i.e., critical. I propose to bridge this divide by devising a strategy for reconciling Critical Theory's emancipative aims with the imperatives of hermeneutical reflection. I bring the critical/diagnostic significance of hermeneutics to the fore by pursuing hermeneutically-informed investigations in various arenas of social and cultural conflict, and I leverage the idea that the legitimacy of a society is a function of the adequacy of its self-understanding. I suggest that a fundamental way in which *illegitimate* social power manifests itself is in the strategic promulgation and policing of the semantic resources available to individuals for their own cultural interpretation, self-understanding, and agency. The antidote to arbitrary or illegitimate restrictions on the interpretive agency of individuals and social groups is hermeneutic or semantic democracy. Such a democratization of hermeneutic agency would promote participation in the interpretive practices that generate collectively binding and enabling social meanings. Accordingly, such democracy is a condition of social legitimacy.