**Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy**

*La société canadienne de philosophie continentale*

**Memorial University, St. John’s, Newfoundland, October 14-16, 2021**

**Congress 2021 Program and Abstracts**

*All times are in Newfoundland Time.*
*Conference presenters and attendees can register [here](#).*

### Thursday, October 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Coffee and Registration</th>
<th>GAIA FERRARI</th>
<th>MAXIME DOYON</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:00 PM-</td>
<td>ROOM: Great Hall, Queen’s College, 210 Prince Philip Drive</td>
<td>(Duquesne University)</td>
<td>(Université de Montréal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:00 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Bending the Future: The Ambiguous Duplicity of the Pure Form of Events” [Virtual]</td>
<td>“Normativity in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Perceptual Phenomena” [In person]</td>
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<td>2:00 PM-</td>
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<td>ROOM: Great Hall, Queen’s College; [Zoom Chair: Maxim Sizov (Memorial University)]</td>
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<td>2:45 PM</td>
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<td>ROOM: 4028, Queen’s College; [Zoom Chair: Christina Mancino (Memorial University)]</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:00 PM-</td>
<td></td>
<td>KYLE NOVAK (University of Guelph)</td>
<td>SOPHIE-JAN ARRIEN (Université Laval)</td>
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<td>3:45 PM</td>
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<td>“We Still Do Not Know What a Body Can Do: The Role of Spinoza’s Problem of the Body in Deleuze’s Philosophy of Immanence” [In person]</td>
<td>“Destruction, Hubris, and History: The Transformation of Hermeneutics in Heidegger’s Thought” [In person]</td>
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<td>4:00 PM-</td>
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<td>ROOM: Great Hall, Queen’s College; [Zoom Chair: Peter Osborne (Memorial University)]</td>
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<td>4:45 PM</td>
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<td>ROOM: 4028, Queen’s College; [Zoom Chair: Michelle Mahoney (Memorial University)]</td>
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**TALIA WELSH** (University of Tennessee, Chattanooga)

“Can I?: A Critical Phenomenology of Gripping During the Pandemic” [Virtual]

ROOM: Great Hall, Queen’s College; [Zoom Chair: Declan Seviour (Memorial University)]

**YUVAL EYTAN** (Tel Aviv University)

“The Problematic Ideal of Happiness: Marx’s Dialectical Negation of Misery” [Virtual]

ROOM: 4028, Queen’s College; [Zoom Chair: Dante Enewold (Memorial University)]
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5:00 PM-</td>
<td>Plenary Session</td>
<td>(University of Freiburg)</td>
<td>Philipp Schwab</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:00 PM</td>
<td>“A Threefold End of Metaphysics? Heidegger on Hegel, Schelling and Nietzsche” [Virtual]</td>
<td>ROOM: Great Hall; Queen’s College; Zoom</td>
<td>Chair: Sean J. McGrath (Memorial University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6:00 PM-</td>
<td>Reception Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, Memorial University</td>
<td>Downtown Location TBD</td>
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<td>8:00 PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:00 AM-</td>
<td>Coffee and Registration</td>
<td>ROOM: Second Floor Foyer, Guv’nor Inn, 389 Elizabeth Ave</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:30 AM</td>
<td>BRUCE GILBERT (Bishop’s University)</td>
<td>“The ‘Institution’ of the Good in Levinas” [In person]</td>
<td>Chair: Joshua Tucker (Memorial University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:30 AM</td>
<td>JAN HALAK (Palacky University Olomouk)</td>
<td>“Revisiting Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Mathematical Reasoning” [In person]</td>
<td>Room: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom Chair: Bradley Dart (Memorial University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30 AM-</td>
<td>MARIANA LARISON (Conicet/UBA/UNGS)</td>
<td>“Vers une nouvelle idée de révolution: un autre fondation, un autre temps” [Virtual]</td>
<td>Room: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom Chair: Maxime Doyon (Université de Montréal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 AM-</td>
<td>SHAWN HUBERDEAU (Villanova University)</td>
<td>“Foucault’s Archaeological Method: Dispersing the Temporal Unity of Phenomenological Experience” [Virtual]</td>
<td>Room: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom Chair: Antoine Gillett (Memorial University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:30 AM-</td>
<td>Plenary Session</td>
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<td>Annie Larivée (Carleton University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 PM</td>
<td>“Philosophy as a ‘way of life’ or as an ‘art of life’? Why Foucault got it right” [Person]</td>
<td>ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom</td>
<td>Chair: Bryan Heystee (Memorial University)</td>
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</table>
12:30 PM - LUNCH AND BUSINESS MEETING (all are welcome)
ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn

2:30 PM - 2:45 PM
CAPUCINE MERCIER
(University of New Mexico)
“The Uses of Vulnerability: Love, Courage, and Death in Nonviolent Resistance” [Virtual]
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: Ilgin Aksoy (Memorial University)

2:30 PM - 3:15 PM
DAVID MORRIS
(Concordia University)
“Wild Structure and ‘Melting Time’: On Quantum Mechanics and Merleau-Ponty’s Temporal Ontology” [Virtual]
ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: Xoana Feas Perez (Memorial University)

3:30 PM - 5:30 PM
Plenary Panel
“Politic of German Idealism” [In person]
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: Suma Rajiva (Memorial University)

3:30 PM - 4:15 PM
JAMES SCOTT JOHNSTON
(Memorial University)
“Kant as the First German Idealist”

4:15 PM - 5:00 PM
SEAN J. MCGRATH
(Memorial University)
“The Politics of Eschatological Time in the Late Schelling”

5:00 PM - 6:15 PM
SHANNON HOFF
(Memorial University)
“Hegel and Sylvia Wynter on the Problem of Human Self-Cognition”

5:45 PM - 6:15 PM
KYLÀ BRUFF
(Carleton University)
“The Role of the State in Schelling’s Political Philosophy”

5:45 PM - 6:45 PM
Plenary Session
EDWARD S. CASEY
(Stony Brook University)
“Taking Emotion Far Out” [Virtual]
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: Laura McMahon (Eastern Michigan University)

6:45 PM - Dinner (on your own)

8:00 PM
Book launch and Reception (food and drink provided)
James Bradley, *Collected Essays in Speculative Philosophy* (EUP, 2021)
SEAN J. MCGRATH
JAMES SCOTT JOHNSTON
JENNIFER DYER
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn
Saturday, October 16

9:30 AM-10:00 AM  
Coffee and Registration  
ROOM: Second Floor, Foyer, Guv’nor Inn

10:00 AM-10:45 AM  
NEAL DEROO  
(The King’s University)  
“Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and the Development of a Phenomenological Politics”  
[In person]  
ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Nicholas Saunders (Memorial University)

G. ANTHONY BRUNO  
(Royal Holloway University of London)  
“Making Itself Explicit: Fichte on Reason, Maturity, and Rational Cognition”  
[Virtual]  
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Joshua Royles (Memorial University)

11:00 AM-11:45 AM  
BENJAMIN DÉCARIE-DAIGNEAULT  
(Université Laval)  
“Toward an Expressive Conception of Reality: The Underlying Ontology of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception”  
[In person]  
ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Shannon O’Rourke (Memorial University)

*Winner of the 2022 CSCP Graduate Student Essay Prize

BENJAMIN BREWER  
(Emory University)  
“Paraontology: Oskar Becker’s Philosophy of Race and the Irony of Ahistorical Phenomenology”  
[Virtual]  
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Aysu Aggül (Memorial University)

12:00 PM-1:00 PM  
Plenary Session  
SCOTT MARRATTO  
(Michigan Technological University)  
“Speaking of Violence: Phenomenology of a Political Task”  
[In person]  
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Shannon Hoff (Memorial University)

1:00 PM-2:45 PM  
Lunch (on your own)

2:45 PM-3:30 PM  
ALEXANDRA MORRISON  
(Michigan Technological University)  
“Democracy and the Norms of Objectivity: A Phenomenological Revision of ‘Strong Objectivity’”  
[In person]  
ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Michael Broz (Memorial University)

DAVID TRACEY  
(Memorial University)  
“Nietzsche and the Appolline Veil”  
[In person]  
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom  
Chair: Amy Mauger (Memorial University)
Saturday, October 16 continued

3:45 PM - 4:30 PM
DYLAN DELIKTA
Independent Scholar
“Hegel’s Symbolic Art and Architecture: Risk and the Possible Encounter of Others” [In person]
ROOM: The Study, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: George Saad (Memorial University)

SAMUEL UNDERWOOD
(Memorial University)
“Speaking of Revelation: Toward a Ricoeurian Critique of Marion” [In person]
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: Sarah Griffin (Memorial University)

4:45 PM - 5:45 PM
Plenary Session: Winner of the 2020 Symposium Book Prize
STELLA GAON
(Saint Mary’s University)
“Aporias of Consciousness: Critical Theory and the Promise of Psychoanalysis” [In person]
ROOM: The Drawing Room, Guv’nor Inn; Zoom
Chair: Alisan Genç (Memorial University)

7:00 PM
Dinner at YellowBelly Brewery (everyone pays own way): Sign up by noon on Friday

Acknowledgments

The CSCP would like to thank the following people and groups for their support in making this conference possible: Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur appui:

Our host:
Memorial University

Our sponsors:
Vice President’s Office, Conference Fund, Memorial University
Scholarship in the Arts Fund, Memorial University

Our organizers:
Sean McGrath (Memorial University) and Shannon Hoff (Memorial University)

Our student assistants:
Margaret Hynes, Theresa Stevens, Benjamin Janes, Dante Enewold, and Maxim Sizov

Our Executive Committee:
Laura McMahon, President (Eastern Michigan University); Antonio Calcagno, Treasurer (King’s College at the University of Western Ontario); Lorraine Markotic, Symposium Editor (University of Calgary); Sophie-Jan Arrien (Université Laval); Mariana Larison (CONICET Buenos Aires/UBA/UNGS); David Morris (Concordia University); Saša Stankovic (Trent University); Jacob Singer (DePaul University)
Abstracts/Résumés

Arrien, Sophie-Jan (Université Laval), “Destruction, Hubris, and History: The Transformation of Hermeneutics in Heidegger’s Thought.” In this paper, I examine the transformation of the Heideggerian hermeneutical gesture in relation to philosophical texts. I argue that it moves from a “phenomenological destruction” (in the 1920s), where interpretation is linked to the experience of positive phenomena (history, self, faith, existence) to a “poietical destruction” (in the 1930s) turned towards a history “to come” and linked to an “original experience” that seems to be the privilege of only poets and thinkers. From then on, Heidegger’s philosophy threatens to sink into a form of hybris (or excess) by overstepping the constitutive finitude of any hermeneutic worthy of the name.

Brewer, Benjamin (Emory University), “Paraontology: Oskar Becker’s Philosophy of Race and the Irony of Ahistorical Phenomenology.” This paper traces the origins of the term “paraontology” from its current usage in critical black studies by thinkers like Fred Moten and Nahum Chandler back to mathematician and phenomenologist Oskar Becker, who coined the term “paraontology” in order to provide a National Socialist phenomenology of race as ahistorical, essential, and natural. Whereas Moten uses the term “paraontological difference” to describe the non-coincidence of the ontological and the ontic, Becker speaks of a paraontological indifference or equation (Gleichung) the seamless continuity of essences across individuals and historical time. Reconstructing Becker’s debate with Heidegger and his theory of race, I argue that the term’s history and current usage demonstrate the ironic failure of Becker’s project, offering a revenge of history, so to speak, against his attempt to articulate an ahistorical phenomenology of race.

Bruno, Anthony G. (Royal Holloway University of London), “Making Itself Explicit: Fichte on Reason, Maturity, and Rational Cognition.” Fichte argues the condition of experience is the absolute freedom of reason, an activity I exhibit by positing myself as self-posting. How can we reconcile his conception of absolutely free reason with his claim that this conception expresses the spirit of transcendental idealism, given Kant’s restrictions on reason? I argue Fichte’s conception radicalizes Kant’s theory of enlightenment. Whereas, for Kant, enlightenment requires resolving to use the understanding without external direction, for Fichte, transcendental idealism requires resolving to exhibit the activity of reason without external determination. I introduce Kant’s concept of maturity from his “Enlightenment” essay and discuss it in light of his First Critique distinction between rational and historical cognition (§1). I demonstrate that Fichte views the spirit of transcendental idealism and wisdom about the absolute freedom of reason through the lens of rational cognition.

Casey, Edward S. (Stony Brook University), “Taking Emotion Far Out.” In this talk, I explore a radically new approach to emotion – new at least compared with most theories of emotion from the modern era. These theories locate emotion squarely inside the human subject, confining it there by way of physiological, neurological, or psychological models of epigenesis. I do not deny the truth of many of these theories at the level of what Merleau-Ponty calls the “objective body,” but I contest their adequacy as accounts of the actual experience of emotion. In this experience, emotion is often something that comes to us from outside ourselves: say, from a contagious mood or from a captivating environmental scene. This is to say that the where of an emotional display can be more important than the how of its generation: its exophany exceeds its endogeny. I pursue the fate of this view of emotion in two quite different contemporary thinkers: Anthony Steinbock and James Hillman. For both authors, emotion implicates a certain dehors or “outsideness” in Gilles Deleuze’s apposite term.

Décarie-Daigneault, Benjamin (Université Laval), “Toward an Expressive Conception of Reality: The Underlying Ontology of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.” I will explore the link between two themes that are developed in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, namely nature and expression. I will argue that the notion of nature that is put forward in this book, when interpreted through the prism of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression, reveals itself as a pathway toward an original ontology. While the author leaves unclear whether the reality that he strives to describe in Phenomenology of Perception has to be understood as a positive substance or as the correlate of a perceptual life, he progressively outlines a more nuanced conception that
outstrips both alternatives. Through his theory of expression, Merleau-Ponty manages to think the emergence of the sensible without having to presuppose, at its source, an objective being. I will highlight the ontological extent of such considerations through the notion of perceptual dialogue, which reveals how inextricable the concepts of nature and expression are from one another.

Delikta, Dylan (Independent Scholar), “Hegel’s Symbolic Art and Architecture: Risk and the Possible Encounter of Others.” I argue that architecture conditions the possibility of sites of exchange (or co-de nition) with others in their otherness because of its proximity to the outside world, whether it be external nature or manmade environments. To do this, I turn to Hegel’s Aesthetics, examining his descriptions of Symbolic Art and Architecture by drawing upon the ways he emphasizes the contingent and uncertain conditions from which symbols and architecture arise. By turning to such descriptions, I believe we better understand how art retains a sense of uncertainty, thereby allowing its meaning to remain in question and always open to future determination by others. Indeed, by being expressions that only hint toward the meanings behind them, the symbol and architecture reveal how we risk giving meaning to the world only after we create determinate sites of meaning to form.

DeRoo, Neil (The King’s University), “Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and the Development of a Phenomenological Politics.” This paper argues for the development of a “phenomenological politics” akin to the phenomenological psychology” of phenomenology’s early days. Such a phenomenological politics arises as a necessity for phenomenological inquiry because experience itself—the subject matter of phenomenology—is inherently political. To show this, the paper begins by de ning ‘political’ as it is employed in the context of phenomenological politics. Then it uses Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh and Husserl’s notion of spirit to make a transcendental case that experience is inherently ‘political’ in this sense. It ends by exploring some social and political implications of this phenomenological understanding of politics.

Doyon, Maxime (Université de Montréal), “Normativity in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Perceptual Phenomena.” Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of perception, illusions and hallucinations are best understood in normative terms. The motifs of equilibrium and reciprocity, which assume an absolutely central role in his conception of perceptual experience, must be regarded as normative for at least two reasons: not only do they allow to think of perception in terms of success and failure (depending on whether the equilibrium the agent and the perceptual world is reached or not, or whether there is reciprocity between the two or not), but Merleau-Ponty also repeatedly stresses that the agent’s self-assessment of his own perceptual state motivates a process of self-correction or optimization teleologically oriented toward the optimum. The paper ﬂeshes out these ideas by presenting a brief outline of the phenomenology of all three phenomena and argues that perception is best understood as norm-guided, and illusions and hallucinations as experiences of deviation from perceptual norms, which are sui generis norms.

Eytan, Yuval (Tel Aviv University), “The Problematic Ideal of Happiness: Marx’s Dialectical Negation of Misery.” In keeping with the Western philosophical tradition, Marx seeks an ideal of life in which man realizes the qualities that set him apart from all other species. I emphasize that one of his most signiﬁcant innovations lies in the idea that the particular element in human beings is the most essential basis for what sets their action apart: the ability to change their living conditions and, in that process, consciously and deliberately alter their own nature, that is, realize their freedom. Marx’s purpose is indeed to overcome misery, but in contrast to many commentators, I claim that this is done not for the sake of happiness, but rather for “real individual activity,” which points to the individuation of all senses and needs and also entails positive suffering involved in the free and open process of self-enrichment.

Ferrari, Gaia (Duquesne University), “Bending the Future: The Ambiguous Duplicity of the Pure Form of Events.” This paper pursues the goal of formulating a general account of what Deleuze means by the future in Difference and Repetition. This account rests on the recognition of the source that allows the future to have neither a passive nor an active character, while, at the same time, explaining the upsurge of the illusion of representation. I maintain that such source is but the ambiguous structure of sufﬁcient reason, which bends the future into two directions or images – either into something ensnared by the quicksand of representation or sucked into an obscure
groundlessness as a positive superior principle. I conclude my paper by claiming that these two images of the future, being either the moralization or the ‘ethicalization’ of the truth of time, understand the vectors of life, change, and becoming in two different manners, which can be exemplified by the opposition between autopoiesis and sympoiesis.

Gaon, Stella (Saint Mary’s University), “Aporias of Consciousness: Critical Theory and the Promise of Psychoanalysis.” The classical question of the relationship of the “soul” and the “city” took on particular significance in mid-20th century, Marxian analysis of ideology critique. Indeed, for first generation critical theorists like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Freud was as important a resource as Marx, because the failure of workers to act in their own interests or to resist the lure of authoritarianism directly contradicted the Enlightenment conception of reason as an emancipatory force. But what can a psychoanalytic account of the relationship between consciousness (the “soul”) and politics (the “city”) promise to critical theory today? And which of the various post-Freudian theories currently under discussion is best able to fulfill that promise? This paper argues that, unlike the object-relations theories of Melanie Klein or Donal Winnicott, Jean Laplanche’s model of primal seduction can be used to explain the social determinants of consciousness. This model does not only illuminate the psychological mechanisms by virtue of which individuals are driven [getrieben] to replicate relations of domination despite their rational interests. It also reveals how the critical promise of psychoanalysis can best be conceived.

Gilbert, Bruce (Bishop’s University), “The ‘Institution’ of the Good in Levinas.” In his later work Emmanuel Levinas strived to show how the self and the infinite Good are both generated rather than simply given. This essay explores Levinas phenomenology of the Good and then suggests how Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “institution” clarifies how unconditional moral imperatives can be rooted in contingent human experiences. The paper also connects these themes to Levinas’ concepts of “metaphysical desire,” “holiness,” the maternal “bounty of the good that commands” and the “different freedom” of ethical response.

Halak, Jan (Palacky University Olomouk), “Revisiting Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Mathematical Reasoning.” This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to an embodied-enactive account of mathematical cognition. I explain how, for Merleau-Ponty, mathematical cognition is fundamentally linked to structural transformation of concrete configurations of symbolic systems to which these symbols appertain, and how these structural transformations are fundamentally linked to motor intentionality. This makes it possible, in turn, to contrast Merleau-Ponty’s approach to ontologically idealistic and realistic views on mathematical objects. On Merleau-Ponty’s relational account of mathematical cognition, mathematical objects are gestalts that necessarily imply situated cognizers to whom they afford a special type of engagement in the world and on whom they depend in their eventual structural transformations. I argue that by attributing a strongly constitutive role to phenomenal configurations and their motor transformation in mathematical thinking, Merleau-Ponty contributes to clarifying the worldly, historical, and socio-cultural aspects of mathematical truths without compromising what we perceive as their universality, certainty, and necessity.

Huberdeau, Shawn (Villanova University), “Foucault’s Archaeological Method: Dispersing the Temporal Unity of Phenomenological Experience.” This paper closely reads Foucault’s empirico-transcendental doublet from The Order of Things as his contribution to the tradition of transcendental philosophy. Foucault’s account of discontinuous temporality, which I reconstruct from his archaeological period, is a historicization of the transcendental and moreover amounts to his ontological answer to the question of how the conditions and conditioned of experience relate. Foucault’s innovative answer is that their relation lacks unity but is tenuously held together by the strained efforts of ‘historical man’. Foucault further argues for the immanence of the transcendental to the empirical in discontinuous temporality’s disintegration of experience. It is only through archaeology that this form of experience can be grasped, for it requires suspending the projective-retroactive synthesis of experience with the concepts of unity and continuity enacted by the constitutive subject of early Husserlian phenomenology.

Larison, Mariana (Conicet/UBA/UNGS), “Vers une nouvelle idée de revolution: un autre fondation, un autre temps.” Il va donc nous intéresser, par la suite, de présenter l’une des nombreuses lectures de la foundation
expresses invisible change. A wilder sort of invisible, indeterminate change that would not yet have an echo within nature, but couldn’t reconcile structure with nature as conceived by physics. This turned him, instead, to perception and his later ontology. This paper suggests show how quantum mechanical systems behave in ways that echo structures and can be understood as generating differential conditions for sense in being. This suggestion hinges on conceptualizing them as structuring or forming visible, determinate time-orders in the first place, from a wilder sort of invisible, indeterminate change that would not yet have a manifest order. Visible time, in other words, expresses invisible change.
Finally, I will bring Marion and Ricoeur into
that have been raised against this account and the
exposition of Marion's account of saturated phenomena. I will
ways on the question of hermeneutics and its role in the phenomenology
names Ricoeur as a major source of her
hermeneutical phenomenology. Although Marion allows hermeneutics into his phenomenology, and
This paper critically examines Marion's phenomenology of saturation from the perspective of Ricoeur's
visible does he form a viable mode of protection against nihilism and the
nihilism. To miss that the Apolline veil is transpare
veiling Dionysos. Thus, certain readers hold that
protecting against the nihilism engendered by the Dionysiac
The debates following the publications of the “Black Notebooks” have aggravated the issue as to
whether one can still productively relate to Heidegger’s thought today at all. The talk will address this issue with
a view to Heidegger’s understanding of the history of metaphysics, and more specifically, his claims concerning
an ‘end’ of metaphysics. In doing so, I intend to work out a specific ambiguity in Heidegger’s claims. On the one
hand, Heidegger insists that there is only one, unique and univocal history of being, which implies that there also
can be only one unique ‘end’ to this history. This insistence leads Heidegger to thinking towards a radical change
and a ‘new beginning’, which is supposed to ‘save the West’. On the other hand, however, in his readings of
Hege, Schelling and Nietzsche, Heidegger indeed puts forward diverse and vastly differing images of what the
alleged end of metaphysics actually amounts to. This plurality of endings opens up possibilities to undermining
the purported ‘uniqueness’ of the history of being, and at the same time sheds some new light on Heidegger’s
ideological commitments.

The Birth of Tragedy presents Apollo as protecting against the nihilism engendered by the Dionysiac insight. Specifically, for Nietzsche, Apollo protects by veiling Dionysos. Thus, certain readers hold that Apollo fully eclipses Dionysos from sight. A veil, however, is not opaque, but transparent, and this transparency is essential to Nietzsche’s understanding of Apollo as protector. Restricting myself to the period of BT, my goal is to show that, contrary to popular opinion, Nietzsche’s Apollo does not blind the Greeks to Dionysos or render Dionysos invisible. Instead, Nietzsche’s Apollo renders Dionysos visible to the human eye. More precisely, the Apolline veil allows us to view Dionysos without succumbing to debilitating nihilism. To miss that the Apolline veil is transparent is a critical oversight since only when Apollo renders Dionysos visible does he form a viable mode of protection against nihilism and the Dionysiac insight.

This paper critically examines Marion’s phenomenology of saturation from the perspective of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutical phenomenology. Although Marion allows hermeneutics into his phenomenology, and explicitly
names Ricoeur as a major source of hermeneutical inspiration, I will argue that the two thinkers diverge in signi
cant ways on the question of hermeneutics and its role in the phenomenology of revelation. I will begin with a brief
exposition of Marion’s account of saturated phenomena. I will then discuss some of the hermeneutical objections
that have been raised against this account and the Heideggerian assumptions that undergird these objections.
Finally, I will bring Marion and Ricoeur into direct confrontation on the question of revelation. I will argue that
Marion takes a “short route” to the phenomena of revelation, like Heidegger’s “short route” to ontology that Ricoeur critiques. Ricoeur prefers instead the “long route” through the interpretation of the texts in which religious experience is expressed.

Welsh, Talia (University of Tennessee, Chattanooga), “Can I?: A Critical Phenomenology of Gripping During the Pandemic.” In this paper, I outline the standard account of illness as a disruption in the “I can” as a disruption in the ability to easily grasp the world as a place in which one’s projects can take place as well as one for which one’s future projects seem possible. I then turn to phenomenologies of disability to highlight how such accounts often discount the cultural and social nature of just who can based not interior physical capacities, but in the connection between world and self. In conclusion, I take up phenomenologies of the pandemic and draw attention away from the individual experience of bodily limitation toward both our local and international responsibility.