

Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy
La société canadienne de philosophie continentale

King's University College, Western University, London, Ontario
October 27-30, 2022

Continental Philosophy in Dialogue with Diverse Global Traditions

Thursday, October 27

4:00 PM-
4:40 PM

Registration

Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, by the Kenny Theatre

4:40 PM-
5:00 PM

Opening Welcome

Laura McMahon, President, CSCP
Dr. Robert Ventresca, Academic Dean, King's University College
ROOM: Kenny Theatre, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre; [Link](#)

5:00 PM-
6:30 PM

Plenary Session

BRET W. DAVIS

(Loyola University Maryland)

"In and Out of Words: Ueda Shizuteru's Zen Buddhist Philosophy of Language"

Kenny Theatre, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre; [Link](#)

Chair: Stephen Lofts (King's University College)

6:30 PM-
8:00 PM

Reception Sponsored by the Office of the Academic Dean, King's University College

Garron Family Lounge, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre

Friday, October 28

9:30 AM-
10:00 AM

Coffee and Registration

Lobby and Student Lounge, Wemple Building

10:00 AM-
10:45 AM

VALÉRIE DAOUST
(Université d'Ottawa)

"Femme-khôra : Exclue ou exclusive? Limites de la critique butlérienne de Luce Irigaray"

Student Lounge, Wemple Building; [Link](#)

Chair: Mariana Larison (Conicet/UBA/UNGS)

DONALD LANDES
(Université Laval)

"Seeing Double, Together. The Social as Binocular Vision in Merleau-Ponty and Simondon"

Lounge Extension, Wemple Building; [Link](#)

Chair: James van Schaik (King's University College)

**11:00 PM-
11:45 PM** DYLAN SHAUL
(University of Toronto)
"The Jouissance of the Absolute Idea: From Logic
to Nature in Hegel's Science of Logic"
Student Lounge, Wemple Building; [Link](#)
Chair: Skylar Izzard (King's University College)

MARIANA LARISON
(Conicet/UBA/UNGS)
"Vers une epoché du temps"
Lounge Extension, Wemple Building; [Link](#)
Chair: Valérie Daoust (Université d'Ottawa)

**12:00 PM-
2:00 PM** LUNCH (on your own) AND BUSINESS MEETING (all are welcome)
ROOM: Dante Lenardon Hall, 112 (Boardroom)

**2:00 PM-
2:45 PM** ANDREW TEBBUTT
(Trinity Christian College)
"The Practical Roots of Language in Hegel's
Challenge to 'Sense-Certainty'"
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 119; [Link](#)
Chair: Skylar Izzard (King's University College)

JOSEPH KEEPING
(York University)
"A Phenomenological Analysis of
Trust and Betrayal"
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 005; [Link](#)
Chair: James van Schaik (King's University College)

PLENARY PANEL:
Inaugural Lectures for the new Centre for Philosophy and Culture
Kenny Theatre, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre; [Link](#)
Chair: Jonathan Geen (King's University College at Western University)

**3:00 PM-
5:30 PM** ANTONIO CALCAGNO
(King's University College at Western University)
"Gerda Walther, Early Phenomenology, and Interpersonal Sociality"

RUSSELL DUVERNOY
(King's University College at Western University)
"Philosophy and Ecological Conversion: Thoughts on the Way"

STEPHEN LOFTS
(King's University College at Western University)
"Nishida's 'Resolute Self-Critique of Culture'"

Plenary Session
YOKO ARISAKA
(University of Hildesheim)
**5:45 PM-
6:45 PM** "The Self-Determination of the "Eternal Now": the Equiprimordiality of
Spatiality and Temporality in Kitaro Nishida"
Kenny Theatre, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre; [Link](#)
Chair: Stephen Lofts (King's University College)

Saturday, October 29

9:00 AM-
9:30 AM

Coffee and Registration
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, Killan Lounge

9:30 AM-
10:15 AM

DAVID TRACEY
(Memorial University)
"Revitalizing Psychoanalysis: On Personal
Desire and Anti-Oedipus"
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 004; [Link](#)
Chair: Skylar Izzard (King's University College)

TILOTTAMA RAJAN
(Center for Theory and Criticism, Western University)
"The Idea as the Negative of Itself': The Sciences in
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature"
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 006; [Link](#)
Chair: Antonio Calcagno (King's University College)

PANEL: Legacies of Slavery and Colonialism
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 004; [Link](#)
Chair: David Morris (Concordia University)

PANEL: Phenomenology East and West
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 006; [Link](#)
Chair: Joshua McNamara (King's University College)

10:30 AM-
12:45 PM

SHANNON HOFF
(Memorial University)
"Fanon, Phenomenology, and
The White Gaze"
SUJAYA DHANVANTARI
(McGill University)
"Ungendering Gender: Spillers, Hartman,
and the Quasi-Transcendental Structure of
Racial Slavery"
WES FURLOTTE
(Thomson Rivers University)
"Coulthard and Marcuse: A Comprehensive
Critique of Domination in the Affluent
Society"

2022 CSCP Graduate Student Essay Prize Honorable
Mention
TING CHEUNG KWOK
(The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
"The Problem of Self-Awareness in Husserl and
Nishida Kitarō's Meta-Phenomenology of Absolute
Nothingness"
ANTHONY CASADONTE
(University of Kentucky)
"Heidegger and Zhuangzi on Being-in-the-World"
KELVIN KA HO
(The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
"Tanabe's Heideggerian Critique of Zen Buddhism"

1:00 PM-
2:30 PM

LUNCH (on your own)

2:30 PM-
3:30 PM

Plenary Session
WILLIAM PARIS
(University of Toronto)
"What Was Black Power? On the Materialist Concept of Rights in James Boggs"
Kenny Theatre, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre; [Link](#)
Chair: Laura McMahon, Eastern Michigan University

PANEL: Gadamer on History and Cross-Cultural Understanding

Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 004; [Link](#)
Chair: James van Schaik (King's University College)

ANDREW FUYARCHUK
(Yorkville University)

3:45 PM-
5:15 PM "The Moving Structure of Reality in Gadamer's
Method of Interpretation: A Philosophy of Life in
the Making of History"

GUILLAUME BOUCHER
(Université de Montréal)
"Gadamer's Fusion of Horizon(s) and its
Ontological Implications via SIKU:
Knowing Our Ice"

*PANEL: Critical Phenomenology and the
Decolonization of Time*

Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 006; [Link](#)
Chair: Russell Duvernoy (King's University College)

NEAL DEROO
(Institute for Christian Studies)

"Why Transcendental Phenomenology Needs
Critical Phenomenology—and Vice Versa"

DAVID MORRIS
(Concordia University)
"Decolonizing Time"

Plenary Session

PJ DIPIETRO
(Syracuse University)

5:30 PM-
6:30 PM

"Trans of Color is an Oxymoron. Humans, nonHuman Animals, and
the Bodies Beneath Animals"

Kenny Theatre, Darryl J. King Student Life Centre; [Link](#)
Chair: Shannon Hoff, Memorial University

7:00 PM

Conference Dinner (sign up at Registration Desk)

Sunday, October 30

9:30 AM-
10:00 AM

Coffee

Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, Killan Lounge

2022 CSCP Graduate Student Essay Prize Winner

BENJAMIN DÉCARIE-DAIGNEAULT
(Pennsylvania State University)

9:30 AM-
10:15 AM

"What Matters: Adorno and Scheler on Love"
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 004; [Link](#)
Chair: Skylar Izzard (King's University College)

"Merleau-Ponty and the 'absolute past of nature':
awakening the wild-flowering world at the horizon of
the lifeworld"

Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 006; [Link](#)
Chair: Antonio Calcagno (King's University College)

PANEL: *Genealogies, Affects, Asceticisms*
Darryl J. King Student Life Centre, 006; [Link](#)
Chair: Joshua McNamara (King's University College)

10:30 AM-
12:30 PM

ZOE ANTHONY
(University of Toronto)
"The Most Dangerous Enemy: Nietzschean Priestcraft and/as Biopolitical Resistance"

NATALIE HELBERG
(Concordia University)
"Fanon's New Wounded and New Humanism"

NATASHA HAY
(University of Toronto)
"The Art of Losing: Michel Foucault and Saidiya Hartman in the Archives"

Acknowledgments

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Nous tenons à remercier les personnes et groupes suivants pour leur soutien :

Our host:

King's University College, Western University

Our sponsors:

Center for Philosophy and Culture
Office of the Academic Dean, King's University College
Department of Philosophy, King's University College

Our organizers

Stephen Lofts, Russell Duvernoy, and Antonio Calcagno

Our Executive Committee

Laura McMahon, President (Eastern Michigan University); Antonio Calcagno, Treasurer (King's University College, Western University); Lorraine Markotic, *Symposium* Editor (University of Calgary); Marie-Hélène Desmeules (University of Sherbrooke); Bruce Gilbert (Bishop's University); Mariana Larison (CONICET Buenos Aires/UBA/UNGS); David Morris (Concordia University); Jacob Singer (DePaul University)

Our student volunteers

Skylar Izzard, Lucas Kettle, Joshua McNamara, Ciara Robinson, James van Shaik, and Braeden Quinn.

Amanda Finlayson and Conference Services
Adam Taylor and King's IT Services

Abstracts/Résumés

Zoe Anthony (University of Toronto), “The Most Dangerous Enemy: Nietzschean Priestcraft and/as Biopolitical Resistance.” In this paper, I will explore Nietzsche’s examination of the ascetic priest as presenting a typology for biopolitical resistance. By biopolitical, I have in mind the “real conditions” of life as individuated, and the materiality that comprises the everyday belonging in the world. The morality of the ascetic priest is, for Nietzsche, reactionary, defensive, and has internalized the physical oppression of social existence into a posture of inauthenticity. However, the ascetic priest still perpetuates life in unfavourable conditions through meticulous attention to the physiological conditions of ailing individuals, and their morality emerges from the lived experience of thwarted power. Nietzsche’s ambiguous relationship to the value of the priests for the maintenance of life—a conflict of reactionary versus active ethic—supports reading the ascetic priests as gaining their paradoxical form of power through biopolitical means at a fundamental level.

Yoko Arisaka (University of Hildesheim), “The Self-Determination of the “Eternal Now”: the Equiprimordiality of Spatiality and Temporality in Kitaro Nishida.” Kitato Nishida (1870–1945), considered the founder of modern Japanese philosophy, developed a unique philosophical system which combined the elements of Jamesian radical empiricism, Fichte’s notion of the absolute will, Hegelian dialectic, and Marx’s historical-materialist ontology, in order to articulate an insight that could be traced back to the Buddhist notion of space and time. In this presentation, I shall articulate what exactly makes Nishida’s philosophical insight a novel one, by focusing on his notion of the “eternal now”. In order to provide a familiar framework, I shall refer to and critique Heidegger’s notion of temporality and Dasein. Nishida’s notion of the “eternal now” could be understood as a thorough *equiprimordiality* of space and time; it is a “self-determination” of space-time through our concrete historical *actions* in the absolute present.

Guillaume Boucher (Université de Montréal), “Gadamer’s Fusion of Horizon(s) and its Ontological Implications via SIKU: Knowing Our Ice.” Gadamer’s fusion of horizon(s) accounts for the dialogical process of coming to shared understandings of the world. It also relates him explicitly to the phenomenological tradition. The paper explores this dialogical process through the concrete case of translations between the Inuktitut and English languages, in relation to sea ice and snow related vocabularies, gathered in the SIKU publication. This approach illuminates the inseparability of language and ontology for Gadamer, since SIKU’s gathering of vocabularies and translations is anchored in horizontal relations to things. This provides concrete empirical material for developing the philosophical thesis that translation is always possible. It also supports an argument against Rorty’s and Vattimo’s readings of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, which brush aside ontology in their respective pursuits of a pragmatist or historicist ethics of inclusivity. The paper holds that an ethics of linguistic inclusivity is not exclusive of an ontological role of things in language.

Antonio Calcagno (King’s University College at Western University), “Gerda Walther, Early Phenomenology, and Interpersonal Sociality.” The phenomenologist Gerda Walther (1897–1977) posits the possibility of a new social act, which she terms telepathy. It is marked by an intimate interpersonal union in which ego and alter ego become capable of sharing in the identical lived experience, though distant from one another. Here, there is no fusion or collective identification; rather, individuals, though they live the experience and mind of the other, never lose or transcend their own individuation. Unlike the act of empathy, there is no analogical transfer. This paper considers Walther’s claims and defends the possibility of a restricted sense telepathy. The author argues that four conditions must be fulfilled for telepathy to occur: the recognition of a social drive; telepathy must be a partially willed act of mind that results in the assumption of a certain stance, but it also comes upon us as an experience, that is, there is a profound passivity to it such that when it occurs we are pulled into it; the subjects of telepathy must be constituted as persons marked by what Walther, following Alexander Pfänder, calls a fundamental essence; and I-splitting. It is these four conditions that make possible the two essential moments of telepathy, namely, the preservation of two autonomous egos with their respective

consciousnesses and the identical living of the same experience, not simply at the level of sense, but as embodied, personal experience.

Anthony Casadonte (University of Kentucky), "Heidegger and Zhuangzi on Being-in-the-World." In this paper, I will continue the dialogue between Heidegger and Daoist studies by exploring the connection between Heidegger's idea of being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*) and this idea in its original context in the Daoist tradition. Taking a story in which Heidegger is said to have drawn upon the Daoist story of the happiness of fish from the Zhuangzi to explain being-with (*Mitsein*), I will analyze this story and work out how it can illustrate and could inspire Heidegger's idea of being-in-the-world and its close cousin being-with. Lastly, I will draw these two ideas together just as they go together in the Daoist story and connect them with Heidegger's later idea of releasement (*Gelassenheit*) to show that they all hang together in a certain orientation which is important to both Heidegger and Zhuangzi.

Valérie Daoust (Université d'Ottawa), "Femme-khōra : Exclue ou exclusive? Limites de la critique butlérienne de Luce Irigaray." L'effacement du sujet femme au moment où celui se présentait comme une possibilité énonciatrice caractérise un courant dominant de la philosophie du féminisme. La critique butlérienne de Luce Irigaray s'inscrit dans ce courant. Butler croit que la pensée de Luce Irigaray conduit, d'une part, à la reproduction d'un sujet femme, soi-disant libéré de sa condition subordonnée dans le système patriarcal, et, d'autre part, à la réitération d'une conception binaire exclusive de la représentation de l'humanité. Je veux montrer que la critique de Butler réduit non seulement la portée émancipatrice de la pensée de Luce Irigaray en ce qui concerne la diversité sexuelle, mais que sa critique de Luce Irigaray produit elle-même des formes d'exclusion de sujets possibles d'énonciation. L'enjeu de cet article tourne autour d'une référence partagée mais disputée à la khōra de Platon, de sa représentation sous une forme humaine, femme, ou défigurée, ainsi que de sa capacité subversive.

Bret W. Davis (Loyola University Maryland), "In and Out of Words: Ueda Shizuteru's Zen Buddhist Philosophy of Language." What is the relationship between language and experience? This question was a central concern of the eminent Kyoto School philosopher and lay Zen master Ueda Shizuteru (1926–2019). In fact, this question has long been a focal issue of the Zen tradition. Famously, if also paradoxically, the Zen tradition has claimed to "not to rely on words and letters" even while producing volumes of texts: poetry and didactic discourses as well as encounter dialogues (*mondō*) and *kōan* collections. Critics have accused Zen of being self-contradictory in this regard, yet Ueda demonstrates that Zen's paradoxical ambivalence toward language is not a problem, but rather the point. Moreover, he explains how Zen teachings and practices can help us radically rethink the relationship between language and experience after the "linguistic turn" in philosophy. In this paper, I examine Ueda's contributions to the philosophy of language by bringing his thought into critical dialogue with continental philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer and scholars of Zen such as Dale S. Wright. In short, Ueda rejects both the viewpoint that we are trapped within the bounds of language and the viewpoint that we could somehow meaningfully dwell outside of language. Rather, he argues, in everyday life as well as—in an intentionally intensified manner—in Zen practice and poetic expression, we are called on to engage in a ceaseless movement of "exiting language and exiting into language."

Benjamin Décarie-Daigneault (Pennsylvania State University), "Merleau-Ponty and the 'absolute past of nature': awakening the wild-flowering world at the horizon of the lifeworld." I attempt to sketch a Merleau-Pontian response to what has now become a classical problem for phenomenology, which is well addressed in Quentin Meillassoux's 2006 book *Après la finitude*. Some events, described as "ancestral" or "without witness," present themselves to us as have preceded our human history, all the while constituting its origin (Big Bang, Earth's formation, etc.). My paper addresses the broader concern of the possibility for a phenomenology of Husserlian descent—which recognizes that every meaningful content is deeply anchored in an intersubjectively determined complex of significations—to approach anything that relates to a radically non-human nature. Is a philosophy of the *Lebenswelt* equipped for thinking through nature as an autonomous domain, fully independent from any human-produced meaning? I open a dialogue between several contemporary interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's early and later works and propose to connect the notion of

“absolute past of nature” (PhP 174) to the notion of “past which has never been present” (PhP 294). Doing so, I establish a continuity between the temporality of an event that is witnessed by absolutely no one, and the pre-objective tension that precedes every perceptual givenness.

Neal DeRoo (Institute for Christian Studies), “Why Transcendental Phenomenology Needs Critical Phenomenology—and Vice Versa.” This paper argues for a two-fold thesis: first, that transcendental phenomenology is best served by adopting a critical method; and second, that critical phenomenology is best served by adopting a transcendental method. To make this case, I will begin by briefly outlining the transcendental phenomenological project (Section I). I will then show how that project requires a critical method to establish the relationship between empirical circumstances and transcendental conditions (Section II). That method enables us to account for a four-fold relationship between empirical and transcendental that, in its turn, clarifies a drive for ‘universality’ is not a necessary part of the transcendental project, but emerges from a particular empirical context, and can be critically transformed (Section III). This, in turn, will enable us to see that the ‘structural’ nature of political oppression has a necessarily transcendental dimension to it that opens new tasks for radical political transformation (Section IV).

Sujaya Dhanvantari (McGill University), “Ungendering Gender: Spillers, Hartman, and the Quasi-Transcendental Structure of Racial Slavery.” In this talk I investigate how Black feminist theory enables us to rethink the concept of gender. In so doing, I trace the genealogical roots of the concept of gender in slaveholding societies with special attention to the works of Hortense Spillers and Saidiya Hartman on the violence of ‘ungendering gender’ amidst anti-Black racial terror. I refer to these feminist scholars to show how the philosophical concept of gender is complicated by the ontological construction of gender along racial and colonial lines, as evidenced in the histories of US slavery and racism. I argue that critical race feminism’s reframing of ontologies and epistemologies of gender offers not only a perspective on their political uses in racializing and colonizing projects, but also the possibility of transforming gender from an oppressive tool of colonial and imperial power into a philosophical concept and liberatory political tool of decolonization and emancipation.

PJ DiPietro (Syracuse University), “Trans of Color is an Oxymoron. Humans, nonHuman Animals, and Bodies Beneath Animals.” This talk contends with what I call the coloniality of transgender. I introduce the realities of infrahuman flesh to foreground the colonial difference that lies between them and trans-monstrous formations. By engaging the body-politics of *travesti* communities in Argentina as well as queer and trans* Latinx communities in the United States, a novel model for decolonizing transgender arises. This model shifts our attention toward affinities and hierarchies among life forms, away from (trans)gender mobilities, and closer to bodily transitions between mundane and spiritual domains within Andean and Mesoamerican cosmologies.

Russell Duvernoy (King’s University College at Western University), “Philosophy and Ecological Conversion: Thoughts on the Way.” Though “ecological conversion” is most familiarly associated with Pope Francis, conversion as figure of transformation exceeds any particular denominational or religious context. Indeed, Pierre Hadot has claimed that “the idea of conversion represents one of the notions that are constitutive for Western consciousness” such that, ultimately, “all education is conversion.” Given both phenomena of forced conversions and the normative ambiguity of distinguishing conversion from indoctrination, more critical investigation is necessary to better understand the volatility of ecological conversion as a figure of change. Drawing on a variety of philosophers and thinkers, the paper explores the dynamic relationship between philosophy and ecological conversion with an eye towards problematics that emerge involving affect, attention, and will.

Wes Furlotte (Thompson Rivers University), “Settler-Colonialism within the Affluence of Canadian Society.” This essay constitutes a sustained effort to interconnect seemingly disparate projects of critical social theory. More precisely, it seeks to substantiate the hypothesis that Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory and Glen Sean Coulthard’s critical

indigenous framework might be reciprocally coordinated to generate a comprehensive critical analysis of domination and colonial domination within the historical specificity of the settler-colonial state that is Canada.

Natasha Hay (University of Toronto), "The Art of Losing: Michel Foucault and Saidiya Hartman in the Archives." My paper sheds light on the philosophical stakes of Saidiya Hartman's writing of history through the prism of Foucault's genealogical method. Its point of departure is the pivotal role of perspective and interpretation in reconfiguring the knowing subject's relation to history. This element of genealogy opens onto Foucault's and Hartman's shared concern with the problematic of how to engage archival traces of structural violence. In comparison with the symptomatic failure of *écriture féminine* to effectively address the intersection of race and gender in structural violence, I explore the literary register of Hartman's revision to silences and erasures in the archives. Examining the reasons for Hartman's reticence toward a redemptive or reparative concept of history, I contend that her figurations of young Black women lost in the transatlantic crossing exercise a modality of counter-memory from below, which defies contemporary appropriations of the slave narrative for corporate and state ends.

Natalie Helberg (Concordia University), "Fanon's New Wounded and New Humanism." I connect Fanon's thinking to preoccupations emerging from Derrida's "The Ends of Man" with the help of two mediators: Catherine Malabou's conception of the 'new wounded' and a Nietzschean/Foucaultian conception of genealogy. I argue that Fanon reveals the limitations of Malabou's thinking on the subject of the new wounded by highlighting figures of the new wounded which, unlike Malabou's new wounded, continue to bear a relation to the possibility of genealogy. I motivate the idea that there is a connection between genealogy and cerebral auto-affection as a means of indicating the respect in which the genealogical retains a place within Fanon's conceptual landscape in spite of his rejection of history as a political resource. The genealogical, in the form of cerebral auto-affection, is what would make it possible for Fanon's new wounded to emerge non-wounded under the banner of the new, non-bloodied and non-bloodying humanism Fanon calls for.

Shannon Hoff (Memorial University), "Fanon, Phenomenology, and the White Gaze." We appear to others, and how we appear is to some extent up to them. Their perspectives can sometimes bear an unusual weight; as Fanon writes, "and then we were given the occasion to confront the white gaze. An unusual weight descended upon us. The world robbed us of our share" (2008, 90). This paper distinguishes three distinct layers in the white gaze: the encounter; the inherited world that backs it up; its own being-at-home. It uses phenomenology's analysis of these three categories—the look, the world, and being-in-the-world—to illuminate the tensions of lived experience, and it uses Fanon's phenomenological analysis of racism to illuminate how these tensions intrinsic to human experience are disavowed in bad faith by racism. The white gaze evades the challenge of encounter by disavowing perspective in others; colonial whiteness aims to eradicate the tension between worlds; and whiteness disavows its being-at-home in materiality.

Joseph Keeping (York University), "A Phenomenological Analysis of Trust and Betrayal." Is trust an emotion? On the traditional conception of emotion as an irruptive phenomenon that seizes and dominates the foreground of consciousness for a time and then passes, we must answer in the negative. Instead, trust resides in the affective background against which such passions appear. Properly understood, this background is not the absence of emotion, but an orientation within a kind of "affective space" that allows objects, people, and situations to show up as affectively valenced. Background phenomena of this sort are challenging to study phenomenologically, because the background is precisely that which stands behind the object of our attention and therefore cannot be thematized. Trust reveals itself mainly in breakdown situations, where its contours are brought into relief against foreground experiences of mistrust and betrayal. Consequently, this study will proceed via phenomenological analyses of a number of concrete instances in which trust is either suspended or broken.

Kathy Kiloh (OCAD University), "What Matters: Adorno and Scheler on Love." I contend that Theodor Adorno's philosophy harbours a materialist ethic of love, exemplified by Adorno's reworking of a formulation of Hegel's, in which

the subject resists dominating the object and instead extends its own freedom toward it. Subject then comes to know object on its own terms. Adorno alters Hegel's description, renaming this moment "the love toward things." It is instructive to compare Adorno's ethic with Max Scheler's theory of material value ethics. Understanding how material values ethics is not a materialist ethic of love might allow us to develop a clearer sense of what Adorno means when he makes that claim that "the love toward things" "rescues" the reified. My aim in this paper is to identify how Scheler's material value ethics fails to meet the need it promises to address—solidarity—and to describe how Adorno orients the subject towards a relation of solidarity with the object.

Ting Cheung Kwok (The Chinese University of Hong Kong), "The Problem of Self-Awareness in Husserl and Nishida Kitarō's Meta-Phenomenology of Absolute Nothingness." In this paper, I argue that Nishida Kitarō's philosophy provides a new perspective on the nature of philosophy and phenomenology by its radical reflection on the phenomenon of self-awareness. As an active philosopher in the early 20th century, Nishida has critically commented on Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. In this paper, I explicate Nishida's simple critique against Husserl regarding the pursuit of the "consciousizing consciousness", and subsequently respond to Nishida's critique on behalf of Husserl and phenomenologists by appealing to the general approach of a non-objectified self-awareness. However, I argue that such responses are insufficient, for Nishida is inquiring into the ground of Husserl's phenomenological method, that is, how is phenomenology possible? In this sense, I present Nishida as a meta-phenomenologist and argue that Nishida's critique is not an attempt to reject the phenomenological method, but only to reappropriate it by illuminating its condition of possibility, namely, absolute nothingness.

Donald Landes (Université Laval), "Seeing Double, Together. The Social as Binocular Vision in Merleau-Ponty and Simondon." In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty describes how binocular vision is neither the result of an adding together of monocular images nor the product of athetic judgment. Rather, it is accomplished when two eyes, acting together, take up the disparation between two images as a call for a new dimension. As such, binocular vision is expressive, neither pure creation nor pure repetition. In this paper, I develop the concepts of "social disparation" and "binocular intersubjectivity" so as to argue that this recasting of Gestalt theory as expressive, where disparation is the emergence of the virtual in the real, opens important pathways to thinking our relations with others on at least three levels: the direct perception of others, the possibility of collective action, and sociality more generally. Bringing Merleau-Ponty and Simondon together particularly on this fine level of collective individuation.

Mariana Larison (Conicet/UBA/UNGS), "Vers une époque du temps." La notion de merleau-pontyenne transtemporalité est peut-être l'une des plus intéressantes et des plus mystérieuses de sa pensée. Introduite dans *Les aventures de la dialectique pour rendre compte du caractère « embryonnaire » de toute révolution*, la transtemporalité nous conduit au cœur de toute histoire. Or, si nous convenons de la pertinence des descriptions merleau-pontiennes, et de la puissance heuristique qu'elles nous apportent en ce qui concerne les phénomènes d'institution, il est tout de même une question qui se pose : cette façon de comprendre le temps ne va-t-elle pas contre l'idée même de temps ? Peut-elle être encore comprise comme temporalité ? Nous trouvons-nous face à une nouvelle conception du temps, à contresens de tous les développements disciplinaires et de notre sens commun le plus immédiat ? Quelle est la portée de cette notion de transtemporalité, quels sont ses droits ?

Stephen Lofts (King's University College at Western University), "Nishida's "Resolute Self-Critique of Culture."" This paper provides a presentation of Nishida's "philosophy of culture" as the very core of his later philosophy of the historical world. It argues that the historical task of philosophy today lies in the development of a "philosophy of culture," where the "of" in "philosophy of culture" must be understood as a double genitive; that is, it must provide both a transcendental critique of the universal form of culture and an existential grounding of culture in the historical world. What is more, because the historical world realizes itself through a plurality of cultures, philosophy, if it is to be truly philosophical, must be an intercultural philosophy of culture. It is only in this way, Nishida argues, that we will be able to develop a "world culture" in which each culture functions in its unique singularity as a "production point,"

as a creative monad, that gives expression to a new world, a world that Nishida calls the “worldly world,” and with this gives birth to a “new humanism.” Nishida’s concept of the “worldly world” opens up the possibility of rethinking the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism as an “open-pluralistic cosmopolitanism.”

David Morris (Concordia University), “Decolonizing Time.” Colonizer’s ‘colonize time’ in claiming to project their ‘destined’ time and history as already ordering the world and legitimating colonization. Whereas colonizing land exposes colonizers to resistances of peoples and places, colonizing time seems to neutralize sensuous impediment, because time is projected and ordered from inside vs. moving through outsides. What would it take to resist this and decolonize time? I argue that encounters with time in fact inherently open us to outside, anarchic, deep change, born of nature, that resists subjectivity—in the way that place ontologically challenges claims to colonize space as an abstract set of ownable locations.

William Paris (University of Toronto), “What Was Black Power?: On the Materialist Concept of Rights in James Boggs.” From the end of the Civil Rights Movement to the beginning of the 1980s James Boggs, an organic intellectual in Detroit automobile unions, set about the task of investigating Black power as a *scientific* concept rather than a metaphor or emotive slogan. For a political concept to be scientific it had to be self-consciously rooted in extant social dynamics as well as composed of clear strategies a social group could appeal to in their struggle for self-emancipation. The aim of this talk is to reconstruct how Boggs thought the relationship between rights and social power. What I propose is that Boggs understands rights as political capacities to constitute effective group formations or to limit the capacities of the dominated. This means that rights are necessarily sites of social struggle and rights will the effects of extant social and productive forces. Black power in our contemporary moment has been disarticulated from rights such that rights have become ideas to which we appeal rather than conditions we make. Black power names a specific conjuncture in the history of US society where rights became both ideologically and politically available spaces of conflict and constitution. The distance from then to now raises important philosophical questions concerning how we understand what freedom should mean, the role of rights, and what vision of social life we need in our time of crisis.

Tilottama Rajan (Center for Theory and Criticism at Western University), “‘The Idea as the Negative of Itself’: The Sciences in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature.” This paper approaches Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature within his encyclopedic project of unifying the sciences under “one Idea.” PN not only adapts Schelling’s hypothesis that nature consists of graduated stages of an evolving “absolute organism,” but applies it to the Encyclopedia itself as a *Stufenfolge der Wissenschaften*, and within it to nature as an ascent of disciplines from mechanics to biology. But since Hegel organizes nature not just through concepts but through the sciences as the imperfect shapes or *Gestalten* by which we grasp nature, PN is doubly removed from the thing-in-itself, giving it a certain reflexivity, as “Spirit” (often personified) struggles with an “alien existence” that it tries to “digest” through the disciplines as man’s “non-organic nature” which he “must make his own.” Focusing on PN’s culmination in the life sciences and specifically medicine, I read these sciences as a mirror-stage that ruinously exposes Spirit to its own finitude.

Dylan Shaul (University of Toronto), “The Jouissance of the Absolute Idea: From Logic to Nature in Hegel’s Science of Logic.” This paper examines the transition from Logic to Nature in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, through Lacan’s psychoanalytic conception of enjoyment (*jouissance*). I argue that the Absolute Idea’s decision to release itself into the externality of space and time emerges from the Absolute Idea’s drive for enjoyment. I further argue that the two other major transitions of Hegel’s Encyclopedia system—from Nature to Spirit, and from Spirit to Logic—can likewise be understood through the constellation of decision, release, drive, and enjoyment. Ultimately, I suggest that the highest enjoyment of the Absolute Idea is to release itself into a new future.

Andrew Tebbutt (Trinity Christian College), “The Practical Roots of Language in Hegel’s Challenge to ‘Sense-Certainty.’” On one account, “the important discussion of language in the opening pages of ‘Sense-Certainty’ [in Hegel’s

Phenomenology of Spirit] cannot ultimately concern language as communicative,” but deals only with “the way a person makes sense of the world to himself.” I show how these two claims cannot be consistently held together, since, as Hegel’s analysis demonstrates, one’s ability to make sense of the world to oneself occurs by virtue of one’s participation in social—that is, communicative—contexts. I address Hegel’s references to language in Chapter I of the Phenomenology, showing that, while Hegel does not appeal to our use of language as a necessary premise in his challenge to “sense-certainty’s” claim, he does locate language on the horizon of perceptual experience, in a way that shows how language, for Hegel, is interwoven with the very sense that things have for us as practically situated agents.

David Tracey (Memorial University), “Revitalizing Psychoanalysis: On Personal Desire and Anti-Oedipus.” Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of Freud goes too far in its disavowal of personal desire. For Freud, personal desires provide manifest access to a latent, true self. Thus, say D&G, Freud overvalues personal desire if he imagines it reflects an eternal, underlying subject. D&G claim that persons and their desires emerge from real historical conditions, or the personal emerges from the impersonal. Thus, personal desire obscures what we are: a set of inhuman and impersonal processes. Their proposed version of analysis will analyze these impersonal processes rather than individuals’ personal desires. If Freud overvalues the personal, D&G undervalue personal desire, and analysis ought to find a middle ground between these two extremes by conceiving of persons not as unchanging personal subjects, nor as purely impersonal and ever-changing processes. Personal subjects and their desires emerge as temporary moments of relative stability within historical processes, and analysis ought to treat them accordingly.

